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OSCAR WILDE’S LONG TAIL:
FRAMING SEXUAL IDENTITY IN THE LAW
LAURA I. APPLEMAN*
This Article argues that narrative has been the hidden link in
the intersection between law and sexual identity, shaping and struc-
turing the relationship between the two.  The power of the hidden
narrative continues to influence legal decisions today, such as the
national debate on same-sex marriage.  I contend that the basis for
this complicated relationship began with a few critical nineteenth
century events, in particular the widely publicized trials of Oscar
Wilde for the crime of sodomy.  I aim to restore the camouflaged work
of narrative to its rightful place in our understanding of sexual
identity in the law.  In so doing, I hope not only to dissect and expose
the complex interrelationships between law, narrative, and sexuality,
but also to clarify the shifting dynamics of legal sexual identity.  Al-
though the Wilde trials, the emergence of gay rights, the act/identity
divide, and the same-sex marriage debates have been variously dis-
cussed in both legal and humanities scholarship, they have never
been studied as a whole, viewed through the lens of the hidden narra-
tive.  This Article asserts that only through recognizing the role of
narrative in structuring our legal definition of sexual identity will
we ever be able to understand how and why courts decide gay rights
cases in the way they do.
I. INTRODUCTION: LAW, NARRATIVE, AND SEXUAL IDENTITY . . 986 R
II. MAPPING THE HIDDEN NARRATIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990 R
III. A HISTORY OF OBSCURITY: THE SLIPPAGE OF IDENTITY
NARRATIVES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 R
A. From Wilde to Bowers v. Hardwick: The Legal
Crystallization of Act into Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004 R
B. Romer v. Evans: Structuring Hardwick’s Absence . . . . . . 1009 R
C. Lawrence v. Texas: Interpretative Uncertainty, Narrative
Woes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 R
Copyright  2011 by Laura I. Appleman.
* Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University. J.D., Yale University; B.A., M.A.,
University of Pennsylvania.  Thanks to Elizabeth Appleman, Peter Brooks, Bennett Capers,
Rose Cuison Villazor, Caroline Davidson, David DeLaura, David Friedman, Liz Glazer, Sally
Gordon, Janet Halley, Lisa Lewis, Serena Mayeri, Melissa Murray, Marc Poirer, Darren Ro-
senblum, Kenji Yoshino, and the participants in workshops at the Georgetown and Syra-
cuse ASCLH conferences for their helpful comments throughout the years.  Thanks also to
Willamette University for their research support.
985
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR403.txt unknown Seq: 2  5-JUL-11 14:49
986 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:985
D. The Armed Forces: Fraternization and Contagion . . . . . . . . 1021 R
IV. AMBIGUOUS, FLICKERING TEXTS: DECODING THE
NARRATIVE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1027 R
A. Twenty-First Century Marriage Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 R
1. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 R
2. Lewis v. Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1030 R
3. Varnum v. Brien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 R
4. In re Marriage Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 R
5. Chambers v. Ormiston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035 R
6. Breaking the Same-Sex Marriage Mold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 R
B. California’s Proposition 8: New Wine, Old Bottles . . . . . . . 1038 R
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043 R
I. INTRODUCTION: LAW, NARRATIVE, AND SEXUAL IDENTITY
Separated by 115 years and over a century’s worth of cultural
change, the 1895 trials of Oscar Wilde1 and the 2010 federal litigation
over California’s Proposition 82 possess some remarkable similarities.
Both had highly visible players on the legal stage—Oscar Wilde in
1895 and superstar litigators David Boies and Ted Olson in 2010.3
Both attracted a tremendous amount of media attention.  And both
functioned as a stage for enacting social-cultural anxiety over
sexuality.
Perhaps most critically, however, both the Wilde trials and the
Proposition 8 trial publicly expressed the myriad hidden narratives
structuring our legal understanding of sexual identity, displaying for
1. Oscar Wilde was a celebrated poet, writer, playwright, belletrist, and public figure
in late nineteenth century England.  Wilde rose to fame as a public figure when at univer-
sity in Oxford, where he founded a group of similarly minded young men who promoted a
cult of the aesthete, both in dress and in lifestyle.  Once Wilde left Oxford, his antics as a
man-about-town with his group of male companions received enormous press, both in En-
gland and in America.  Following a hugely successful speaking tour of the United States,
Wilde settled in London and began to write plays, the most popular of which was The
Importance of Being Earnest, a light comedy of manners filled with drawing room hijinks
hinting at a variety of homosexual identities.  Ultimately, Wilde “led an aesthetic revolution
against the stifling proprieties of the Victorian era, championing a new freedom in artistic
expression.”  Steven Lubet, The Importance of Being Honest, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 163, 163 (2005);
see also MICHAEL S. FOLDY, THE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE: DEVIANCE, MORALITY AND LATE-
VICTORIAN SOCIETY, at ix–x (1997) (tracing Wilde’s “incredible five-year run of virtually
uninterrupted critical successes”).
2. Proposition 8 was a public initiative in California that added a section to the state
constitution banning same-sex marriage.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193–94
(9th Cir. 2011).
3. See Maureen Dowd, An Odd Couple Defends Couples That Some (Oddly) Find Odd, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at WK9.
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all the relationship between narrative, law, and sexual identity.4  Nar-
rative, explicit and implicit, has been the hidden link between law and
sexual identity, shaping and structuring the relationship between the
two.  Importantly, as this Article will argue, this complex and difficult
relationship is based on events occurring in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, in particular the widely publicized trials of Oscar Wilde for the
crime of sodomy.5
In this Article, I aim to restore the camouflaged work of narrative
to its rightful place in our understanding of legal sexual identity.  In
so doing, I hope to clarify the shifting, labile dynamics of sexual iden-
tity at work in the law.  Although the Wilde trials, the emergence of
gay rights, the act/identity divide, and the same-sex marriage debates
have been discussed in both legal and sociological scholarship,6 they
have never been studied as a whole, viewed through the lens of the
hidden narrative.  Only by recognizing how narrative continues to qui-
etly structure our legal definition of sexual identity will we ever be
able to understand how and why courts decide gay rights cases in the
way they do.7
Oscar Wilde’s three trials provided a forum to display and enact
Anglo-American anxieties over sexual identity politics—with deadly
consequence.  Wilde, a celebrity on both sides of the Atlantic, was con-
stantly in the press, and the scandal of his trials proved remarkably
popular.8 In part, this popularity ensued because Wilde’s trials were
one of the first public displays of “deviant” sexual identity.9  Public
understanding and interest in same-sex marriage function in a similar
pattern today.  In other words, same-sex marriage occupies the same
4. See infra Parts II, IV.B.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers
v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1726 (1993) (noting that an adequate understanding of
sodomy “requires an acknowledgement that the historiography of sodomy is permeated by
the instability of act and identity”); Melinda S. Miceli, Morality Politics vs. Identity Politics:
Framing Processes and Competition Among Christian Right and Gay Social Movement Organiza-
tions, 20 SOC. FORUM 589, 590 (2005) (examining the conflict between Christian Right
organizations and gay-rights advocates by applying a social movement organization framing
analysis to battles over sexuality issues in public education); Anthony R. Reeves, Sexual
Identity as a Fundamental Human Right, 15 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215, 215–16 (2009)
(noting the contemporary relevance of the second Oscar Wilde trial); Sarah A. Soule, Go-
ing to the Chapel? Same-Sex Marriage Bans in the United States, 1973–2000, 51 SOC. PROBS. 453,
453 (2004) (analyzing “factors that influence state bans on same-sex marriage”).
7. See infra Parts III–IV.
8. See, e.g., Central Criminal Court, TIMES (London), Apr. 4, 1895, at 7 (“The case ex-
cited great public interest, and the court was crowded.”).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 37–61. R
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cultural space in twenty-first century society as the newly “discovered”
figure of the homosexual did in the nineteenth century.10
As illustrated by the explosion of the Wilde trials, sexuality be-
came a key aspect of identity by the end of the nineteenth century,
permeating all domains of knowledge, feeling, culture, and subjectiv-
ity.11  Nothing could avoid sexuality’s long tendrils.  Thus, to under-
stand the origins of our current legal and social unease with same-sex
marriage, sexual orientation, and identity politics, we must first return
to the site of their construction: Oscar Wilde’s trials and
punishment.12
Sexual identity in the law, long contained in one oppressive ho-
mosexual/heterosexual dyad, has been greatly influenced by para-
digm-shifting nineteenth century events like the criminalization of
male homosexuality in 1885 England,13 the medicalization of gay-
ness,14 and the sensationalized Wilde trials.  For over one hundred
years, the law’s strategy for controlling homosexuality has been to con-
tain it, shrinking it to one act and one understanding.15  This
homophobic singularity of legal interpretation sets itself against a gay
multiplicity of meaning,16 an explosion of multiple gay voices: These
voices are, in a critical sense, multiple narratives that resist the domi-
nation of one legal voice.
The slippage we find between narrative and sexual orientation in
the law belies the role of narrative in the structuring of the act/iden-
tity debate—a debate that forms an intrinsic part of the legal status of
sexual orientation.17  Underlying our ideas of legal sexual identity18 is
10. See infra Parts III–IV.
11. CHRISTOPHER CRAFT, ANOTHER KIND OF LOVE: MALE HOMOSEXUAL DESIRE IN EN-
GLISH DISCOURSE, 1850–1920, at 27–28 (1994).
12. See infra Part II.
13. In 1885, England’s Parliament passed the Labouche`re Amendment, which made
male homosexual acts criminal. See Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c.
69, § 11 (Eng.), repealed by Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 140, sch. 7 (Eng.) (designat-
ing as a misdemeanor acts of “gross indecency” between two males).
14. As I discuss in Part II, the 1892 publication of Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s
Psychopathia Sexualis did much both to popularize and to recast gay acts into a gay male
identity that was to be treated by the medical establishment. See also William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880–1946,
82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1022–25 (1997) [hereinafter Eskridge, Construction of the Closet] (dis-
cussing Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis and Havelock Ellis’s Sexual Inversions).
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. By “a gay multiplicity of meaning” I mean a multifaceted gay identity.
17. See infra Part III.
18. The legal definition of sexual identity is heavily based on using acts to define iden-
tity.  Thus, doing homosexual “acts” is enough to give you a sexual identity legally defined
as homosexual.  This pigeonholing often creates a legal sexual identity that is not truly
reflective of gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or queer identity.
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an entire web of narrative and story telling that has still not been fully
exposed.
This complex configuration of law, narrative, and sexual orienta-
tion particularly impacts the law’s contemporary attempts to grapple
with the politics of homosexual identity.19  Specifically, the compli-
cated construction of homosexuality created in the late nineteenth
century has shaped the politics of homosexual identity at work in
noteworthy gay rights cases, such as Bowers v. Hardwick,20 Romer v. Ev-
ans,21 Lawrence v. Texas,22 and the same-sex marriage opinions from
states like Massachusetts, New Jersey, Iowa, California, and Rhode
Island.23
Part II will locate the creation of legal homosexuality in the nine-
teenth century paradigm shift from male-on-male sexual acts to homo-
sexual identity.24  I will then trace some of the current legal
interpretations of gay identity to the Oscar Wilde trials, which simpli-
fied the nineteenth century pyschotherapeutic notions of the homo-
sexual and funneled them into the public sphere.25
Part III will first look at the slippage between act and identity that
was crystallized in Bowers v. Hardwick.26  It will take a detailed look at
Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, exposing the unarticulated nar-
ratives lurking beneath the surface and exploring the way in which
both texts continue to reify the same rift between act and identity,
despite their otherwise positive contributions to gay rights.27  Then,
Part III will look at how this crystallization has appeared repeatedly in
recent military cases and legislation such as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”28
Part IV will examine the recent spate of state court same-sex mar-
riage decisions, including Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,29
Lewis v. Harris,30 In re Marriage Cases,31 Chambers v. Ormiston,32 and
19. William Eskridge illustrates this in his persuasive writings on the topics of sexual
orientation and identity. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Move-
ments and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 419–23 (2001) (describing the evolution of
“identity-based social movements” as a process in which law provides stigmatized groups a
forum for objecting to exclusion and discrimination by hostile groups, thus laying claim to
constitutional rights).
20. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
21. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
22. 539 U.S. 558.
23. See infra Part IV.A.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 36–58. R
25. See infra text accompanying notes 59–83. R
26. See infra Part III.A.
27. See infra Part III.B–C.
28. See infra Part III.D.
29. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
30. 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
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Varnum v. Brien.33 In this Part, I will argue that the Wildean narrative
legacy produced state court definitions of gay identity that are just as
narrow, if not as toxic, as the more familiar territory of act-equals-
sexual-identity.34  Part IV also will examine some of the narrative and
rhetoric surrounding the recently passed anti-gay marriage proposi-
tions, focusing particularly on the battle over California’s Proposition
8 and its ongoing federal litigation.35
Finally, Part V will offer a few concluding thoughts on the law’s
acknowledgment of the role of narrative in sexual identity.
II. MAPPING THE HIDDEN NARRATIVE
The Wilde trials were a forum where hidden narratives first struc-
tured the relationship between law and sexual identity.  These narra-
tives were simultaneously literary, cultural, psychological, and pseudo-
scientific.  This was no accident, as sexualized identity, in general, and
homosexual identity, in particular, emerged predominantly at the end
of the nineteenth century.36  In the first volume of his The History of
Sexuality, Michel Foucault discussed the tremendous paradigm shift
from sexual acts to sexual orientations or identities.  Foucault located
the genesis of a distinct sexual identity at about 1870:
The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a
past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a
type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet
anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. . . .  Homosex-
uality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was
transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of inte-
rior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul.  The sodomite
had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a
species.37
31. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 7.5, declared unconstitutional by Perry v. Schwarzennegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (holding that California’s Proposition 8 eliminates the right of same-sex couples to
access the designation of “marriage” but does not affect their right to establish “an offi-
cially recognized family relationship”); see also Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 75–77 (Cal.
2009).
32. 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007).
33. 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
34. See infra Part IV.A.6.
35. See infra Part IV.B.
36. See Kenneth L. Schneyer, Avoiding the Personal Pronoun: The Rhetoric of Display and
Camouflage in the Law of Sexual Orientation, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1313, 1319 (1994) (explain-
ing the relatively recent emergence of a discrete identity group of people who are
“homosexual”).
37. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon
Books 1978).
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The new, late nineteenth century understanding of a “homosexual” or
“invert,” a person who was structured and defined by his38 sexual
proclivities—a person who not only participated in “inverted” acts but
embraced and helped comprise an “inverted” subculture—ended up
having consequences for all Anglo-American society.
Although sodomy laws were imported from England to the colo-
nies in the seventeenth century, until the late nineteenth century, sod-
omy was classified with all other nonprocreative sex outside of
marriage and criminalized as “against public morals and decency” but
applied to the general population.39  In contrast, in the “gay” 1890s,
heterosexuality seemed to be pitted against homosexuality, a repres-
sive “either/or” dichotomy that faced off the one (one “right” sexual-
ity) against the many (a multiplicity of sexualities and identities).  This
crisis of sexuality and identity permeated every facet of Anglo-Ameri-
can society, a phenomenon that continues to this day.
Assisting in this shift from sexuality-as-act to sexuality-as-persona
were a multitude of cultural, legal, and literary actors, all exploding
on the stage of late nineteenth century London.  Laying the founda-
tion for the spectacular scandal of the Wilde trials were two key texts
of self-proclaimed science, widely available on both sides of the Atlan-
tic.  The “new secularized vocabulary” drawn from these texts would
be heavily used in classifying homosexuality as a degenerate status, not
38. I use “his” instead of a gender-neutral term because lesbianism at the turn of the
century was poorly defined, not criminalized, and never included in the Wildean escapades
of gay life. See Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1010 (noting that after R
1880 urban-American enforcement of sodomy prohibitions “increasingly focused on men
committing consensual acts (oral sex, increasingly) with one another”).  In fact, very close
relationships, encompassing the erotic, were common between nineteenth century wo-
men. See, e.g., DREW GILPIN FAUST, MOTHERS OF INVENTION: WOMEN OF THE SLAVEHOLDING
SOUTH IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 142 (1996) (detailing how young women around the
time of the Civil War, deprived of heterosexual courtship, turned to each other “for a
surrogate interior life”).  However, the anti-sodomy laws did ultimately affect lesbians as
well: “The medicalization which yielded inverts and homosexuals as objects of control was
more centrally interested in controlling the bodies of women, by prohibiting abortion and
contraception, by valorizing marriage to a man, and by demonizing same-sex intimacy with
other women.”  Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1098. R
39. As Eskridge notes,
[T]he presumptive sinfulness of bodily pleasure . . . was the overwhelming reason
for punishing sodomy [in early America]. . . .  When American states systemati-
cally codified their criminal laws in the middle and late nineteenth century, most
of them included sodomy prohibitions in the same title or chapter as, and in
close proximity with, adultery, fornication, blasphemy, and incest (typically
termed “crimes against public morals and decency”).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631, 647 [herein-
after Eskridge, Historiography].
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merely sinful conduct.40  The 1892 translation of Richard von Krafft-
Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis41 and the 1897 publication of Havelock
Ellis and J. A. Symond’s The Study of Sexual Inversion42 were both piv-
otal in this regard.43  These two texts—narratives, if you will—popu-
larized and promoted the bifurcation between the heterosexual and
the homosexual, spreading the idea that the “invert,” like the “hys-
teric” and the “suicide,” was an aberration—a particular type of per-
son, not a tendency found in all people and all flesh.44
The translated texts of Psychologies of Sex and Sexual Inversion were
widely read and discussed, contributing greatly to the idea that homo-
sexuality was a way of life, albeit a neurotic one,45 that hopefully could
be cured by the wonders of medicine and science46: “What had once
been figured as a perverse potential residing in all beings . . .
bec[a]me a definitive singularity; inversion, masochism, fetishism,
etc., [were] classified as functional diseases of the ‘sexual instinct.’”47
40. Id. at 651–52 (discussing the shift in emphasis from conduct to status).
41. The text of Psychopathia Sexualis was originally published in German in 1886.  Susan
R. Schmeiser, The Ungovernable Citizen: Psychopathy, Sexuality, and the Rise of Medico-Legal Rea-
soning, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 163, 180 & n.56 (2008).  It was reprinted for an English-
speaking audience in 1892.  Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1023. R
42. Although it was ultimately suppressed in England, the text was later published in
America as volume two of Ellis’s huge work, Studies in the Psychology of Sex. CRAFT, supra note
11, at 31. R
43. See Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1022–23 (discussing the im- R
pact of these works). Sexual Inversions helped bring the idea of the “invert” to the Anglo-
American medical world. Id. at 1023.
44. Id. at 1022–23 (including the texts as examples of the trend towards conceiving
inversion as status rather than act).
45. Id. at 1022–25. But see KEVIN KOPELSON, LOVE’S LITANY: THE WRITING OF MODERN
HOMOEROTICS 157 n.6 (1994) (pointing out that readers of Krafft-Ebing’s book were
warned that “homo-sexuality” was limited to the sexual life, without affecting character and
mental personality).  Though Kopelson’s point casts a slightly different light on the text’s
general reception and interpretation, I would argue that regardless of the author’s inten-
tions, the homosexual’s inclusion in this “psychopathic” classification led the general audi-
ence to regard homosexuals as just another character in a parade of abnormality, all of
whom were defined as wrongly different from the rest of society.
46. See KOPELSON, supra note 45, at 1 (“Followers of Michel Foucault consider sexuality R
to be a vexed and vexing cultural construction formed by, at the very least, three powerful
discourses: theology, medicine, and law.”).  There are strong similarities between the medi-
cal establishment’s treatment of women and gays: both have been treated as diseased,
flawed, and/or in need of counseling and medicine. See generally ELAINE SHOWALTER, HYS-
TORIES: HYSTERICAL EPIDEMICS AND MODERN CULTURE (1997).  By medicalizing difference,
the establishment had a way of restraining and controlling anxiety-causing characters who
threaten to disrupt—if not explode entirely—the complex web of empire, nationalism,
sexual construction, and spectacularly enforced gender roles that was the bulwark of nine-
teenth century British society (and, to a slightly lesser extent, American society as well).
47. CRAFT, supra note 11, at 29. R
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In this way, the late nineteenth century discourses on inversion48
prompted the polarization of heterosexual and homosexual identities,
using the latter as a foil for proper, godly,49 and empire-building
sexuality.50
The Anglo-American legal world mirrored this new interest in
sexual identity and “deviance.”  In 1885, Parliament passed the
Labouche`re Amendment,51 which criminalized the act of homosexual
sodomy52 but glossed it as a ban on “gross indecency.”53  As William
48. The Hellenistic movement at Oxford contributed to the discussion in this new
form of sexual identity.  Although a detailed discussion is not in the scope of this Article,
the popularization of man-boy love—in both its spiritual and physical manifestations—and
Hellenistic philosophy, combined with Oxford’s decadent, showy undergraduates (one of
them, of course, Oscar Wilde) and the University’s close proximity to London, led to socie-
tal recognition of at least the less disruptive elements of this new male “type.” See LINDA C.
DOWLING, HELLENISM AND HOMOSEXUALITY IN VICTORIAN OXFORD 27–28 (1994) (describing
the Hellenistic movement at Oxford as a “space within which may be glimpsed the major
themes of a subsequent twentieth-century struggle for homosexual tolerance and civil
rights, a fully developed language of moral legitimacy, of physical wholesomeness, of the
psychic richness, beauty, and creativity of male love”). Such was the influence of these
vibrant personas, variously labeled as aesthetes and dandies, that Gilbert and Sullivan wrote
an entire musical parodying their movements.  In Patience, which features the young
Wildean aesthete Bunthorne, W.S. Gilbert wrote songs that poked fun while acknowledg-
ing their “artistic” influence.  Such lines as “If you walk down Piccadilly with a poppy or a
lily in your mediæval hand,” which appeared in the stanza celebrating “An attachment a` la
Plato,” can be read as clear indicators of the central place that discussion of homosexuality
took in late nineteenth-century England. W.S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, THE COM-
PLETE PLAYS OF GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 169 (1976).
49. The new crystallization of male heterosexuality fit in well with the idea of Muscular
Christianity, a more “manly” kind of faith. See Erin E. Buzuvis, Survey Says . . . A Critical
Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a Proposal for Reform, 91 IOWA L. REV. 821, 848–49
(2006) (“The muscular Christianity movement . . . introduced Americans to the idea that
sports were integral to the development of men, who society worried were becoming too
effeminized . . . .  Athletics . . . were deliberately touted as the antidote to this perceived
weakness.  In this context, participating in athletics was as much about defining what it
means to be a man as what it means to be not a woman.”).
50. As Eskridge argues in a similar vein, the legal demonizing of same-sex intimacy
simultaneously helped “normalize” opposite-sex relationships.  Eskridge, Construction of the
Closet, supra note 14, at 1094–96. R
51. Also known as the “Blackmailer’s Charter,” the Labouche`re Amendment (an addi-
tion to the Criminal Law Amendment Act) was thought to lead to an increase in the num-
ber of suicides committed by homosexuals. KOPELSON, supra note 45, at 34.  Many R
desperate homosexuals saw suicide as their escape, as the now-legalized exposure could
mean social, professional, and economic ruin, if not incarceration. Id.
52. Sodomy was criminalized before the gay nineties, of course; it was a serious, occa-
sionally capital offense in both England and America until the late twentieth century.  Es-
kridge, Historiography, supra note 39, at 643–45, 659. Homosexual sodomy, however, was not R
singled out as a particular crime in England until 1885. See Eskridge, Construction  of the
Closet, supra note 14, at 1012 (explaining that the sixteenth century crime of buggery re- R
ferred to anal intercourse by either two men or a man and a woman).  Likewise, in the
United States, before the 1880s, “[c]rime-against-nature statutes were the only formal regu-
lations of same-sex intimacy,” and they were rarely enforced, particularly in cases involving
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Eskridge observed, “Coming at a time when subcultures of male in-
verts had formed at the fringes of society, Labouchere’s Amendment
was an important regulatory expansion that permitted English author-
ities to regulate those subcultures through arrests for oral sex (which
was understood to be the chief object of ‘gross indecency’).”54  The
enthusiastically enforced Labouche`re Amendment made both the acts
and the very being of the homosexual illegal but refused to name the
very actions it criminalized.55  From the beginning, the narrative of
homosexual acts and identity, seen as one and the same, was hidden
from public view but had dire legal consequences.
Likewise, it was not until at least the late nineteenth century that
male-on-male sodomy specifically was criminalized in America; before
that, although sodomy was illegal, it was equally illegal for all to per-
form.56  In the 1880s, “sodomy laws came to be more systematically
enforced in major American cities, and they came to be enforced in-
creasingly against consensual same-sex intimacy.”57  For various rea-
sons, sodomy, as performed by “inverts” and “degenerates,” merited
increased discussion in the last twenty-some years of the nineteenth
century.58
consenting adults. Id. at 1015.  Indeed, sodomy laws were primarily enforced “in situations
more akin to rape and seduction, that is, where a man was allegedly assaulting a less power-
ful man, child, woman, ward, or animal.” Id. at 1014.  After 1880, in the urban settings of
the East, Midwest, and West Coast, sodomy laws were increasingly enforced against men
committing consensual acts with each other. Id. at 1016–17.
53. The amendment reads as follows:
Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or is a party to the commis-
sion of or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of,
any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable at the discretion of the court
to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard
labour.
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 69, § 11 (Eng.).
54. Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1026–27. R
55. See supra note 53. R
56. See Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1012 (“[T]he regulatory R
philosophy of sodomy or crime-against-nature laws was not focused on consensual same-sex
intimacy for the first 350 years of Anglo-American regulation.”).  As Eskridge explains, “As
they were applied in 1868, sodomy laws were not inconsistent with [the libertarian pre-
sumption].  As I argued to the Supreme Court in Lawrence, reported cases in the nine-
teenth century were wholly limited to unconsented sexual activities or, later on, public
activities.”  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of
Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1055 (2005) [hereinafter Eskridge, Body
Politics].
57. Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1012.  Eskridge goes on to note R
that a number of states, including Michigan, Massachusetts, Maryland, and California, spe-
cifically banned oral sex between males, while other states, such as Pennsylvania, amended
their existing laws to prohibit both oral and anal sex. Id. at 1027.
58. Eskridge, Historiography, supra note 39, at 655. R
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Things all came to a head with the three trials of Oscar Wilde in
the late 1890s.  The first of Wilde’s three trials was actually a criminal
libel trial he brought against the Marquis of Queensberry for accusing
him of “Posing as a Somdomite [sic].”59  For the mores of that era, it
was unacceptable to even insinuate such a grave insult, and the press
covering the first trial would only refer to Queensberry’s sobriquet as
“some objectionable words written on a visiting card.”60  The silent
narrative of Wilde’s sexual orientation, or potential proclivities, was
thus so radioactive that not only did the papers refuse to name it, but
it ultimately poisoned Wilde’s role as the original plaintiff, leading to
the incarceration of Wilde, not Queensberry, for “gross indecency.”61
Ultimately, Wilde lost the libel case, but his loss did not spell the
end of Wilde’s time in court.  On the evening his libel trial ended,
Wilde was arrested on the charge of “gross indecency,” partially based
upon the evidence Queensberry had gathered in his own defense and
partially based on the extremely damaging testimony Wilde gave dur-
ing his cross-examination in the libel case.62  This second case ended
in a hung jury.63  Once Wilde’s dirty laundry, physical and narratologi-
cal, was aired, however, the British Crown would not let it be buried.
The gross indecency charges were retried in front of another jury, and
in this third trial, Wilde was convicted and sentenced to two years of
hard labor.64
Widely publicized throughout England, North America, and Eu-
rope, Oscar Wilde’s trials conflated the author’s writing with his life,
mixing his fictional narratives with his real-life stories.  Put another
way, the trials were both “documented events and representational de-
59. Ed Cohen, Typing Wilde: Construing the “Desire to Appear to Be a Person Inclined to the
Commission of the Gravest of All Offenses,” 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1–2 (1993).  As the
Queen’s Counsel, Sir Edward Clarke, explained,
The words of the libel were not directly an accusation of the gravest of all of-
fences—the suggestion was that there was no guilt of the actual offence, but that
in some way or other the person of whom those words were written did appear—
nay, desired to appear and pose to be a person inclined to the commission of that
gravest of all offences.
Central Criminal Court, supra note 8.  In other words, even the insinuation that Wilde was R
enacting a false narrative of homosexuality was so damaging as to be criminal.
60. Police, TIMES (London), Mar. 11, 1895, at 4; see also Central Criminal Court, supra note
8 (referring to the subject of the libel suit as “a visiting card of Lord Queensberry’s . . . and R
it had written upon it certain words which formed the libel complained of”).
61. See Anne B. Goldstein, Reasoning About Homosexuality: A Commentary on Janet Halley’s
“Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick,” 79 VA. L. REV.
1781, 1786–88 (1993) (discussing the libel trial and its aftereffects).
62. Id. at 1788–89.
63. FOLDY, supra note 1, at 66. R
64. Lubet, supra note 1, at 53. R
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vices.”65  This conflation was nowhere more evident than in the prose-
cution’s use of Wilde’s books and plays as actual evidence of his
immorality and indecency in his latter two trials for “gross
indecency.”66
One of the most damaging pieces of “evidence” used against
Wilde in his “gross indecency” trials was the purported link between
Wilde’s literature and his life—information drawn out of Wilde dur-
ing his cross-examination at the first libel trial.67  Arguing that “Wilde
was a man of letters and a dramatist of prominence and notoriety and
a person who exercised considerable influence over young men,”
Queensberry’s plea of justification to Wilde’s libel charge claimed,
[T]hat the said Oscar . . . Wilde . . . did write and publish
and cause and procure to be printed with his name upon the
title page thereof a certain immoral and obscene work in the
form of a narrative entitled “The Picture of Dorian Gray”
which said work was designed . . . to describe the relations,
intimacies, and passions of certain persons of sodomitical
and unnatural habits, tastes, and practices.68
Wilde’s writings were transformed into an assertion that his sexual
practices were not only necessary public knowledge69 but also a reflec-
tion of his own life.  Wilde’s own writings were neatly co-opted by his
accusers and turned against him.  Punished for his subversive texts, he
was veritably hoisted by his own narrative petard.
The literature that Wilde wrote was given weight because of its
narrative components, that is, due to its purported relevance to and
reflection of the author’s life.70  Ironically, while Wilde was undergo-
65. Judith Fingard, Book Review, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 83, 83 (1999) (reviewing FOLDY,
supra note 1). R
66. This followed the approach of Queensberry’s counsel in the libel trial, who invoked
The Picture of Dorian Gray while cross-examining Wilde. FOLDY, supra note 1, at 2; Goldstein, R
supra note 61, at 1786–87. R
67. See Cohen, supra note 59, at 3–4 & n.4 (describing the focus on Wilde’s writings R
during the libel trial and noting the importance of the evidence gathered by Queensberry
to the subsequent trials). The transcript of Wilde’s first trial, which included the incredibly
damning cross-examination focusing on both his taste for literature and for young men,
was read into the proceedings at both of his subsequent trials. See FOLDY, supra note 1, at R
5–18, 34–35 (providing excerpts of the cross-examination.
68. Cohen, supra note 59, at 3 (second alteration in original). R
69. Id.  Cohen additionally asserts that by “[i]nterpreting the interactions between the
male characters in The Picture of Dorian Gray as a reflection of the ‘sodomitical and unnatu-
ral’ relations that Wilde was supposed to have engaged in his life . . . the defense plea
introduces a theory of representation that defines Wilde’s text as a vehicle ‘calculated to
subvert morality and to encourage unnatural vice.’” Id. at 3–4 (footnote omitted).
70. See id. at 4 (“[B]y linking the claim that Wilde was a particular type of sexual ‘char-
acter’ (and not that he had committed certain sexual acts) to a suggestion that this charac-
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ing the humiliating spectacle of his trials, his play, The Importance of
Being Earnest,71 was unfolding on the stage.  They performed simulta-
neously for their London audiences.72  Both concerned homosexual-
ity,73 but while the play was a gleeful celebration of the invert’s double
life, the trial was a condemnation of that life.  Ultimately, brutally, the
legal narrative triumphed.
In Wilde’s second and third trials, the use of “psychological” nar-
ratives, although obscured, was much more subtle.  The varied charac-
ter-narratives created by Krafft-Ebbing’s book—specifically, the invert
and the sadist—were invoked by the prosecution to convict and hu-
miliate the author.  Wilde was also extensively cross-examined about
his novel The Picture of Dorian Gray,74 a cross-examination that was later
used to “prove” Wilde had engaged in sodomy.
No longer just a mere perpetrator of sodomical acts, Wilde,
through the course of the trial, was transformed into a homosexual
being—one whose main identity was his “inverted” nature.  Sadism and
homosexuality were seen as equivalent in the late nineteenth century,
with the invert in general (and pederast in particular) often read as
murderous victimizers of their young beloveds.75
terization had larger social implications because he was a writer, [Queensberry’s] plea
introduces the possibility of reading Wilde’s sexual proclivities into his writing in order to
confirm him as a ‘certain person of sodomitical and unnatural habits, tastes, and practices.’
In other words, by foregrounding the literary text as an indication of its author’s . . . sexual
characteristics, the plea attempts to construct a way of discerning and subsequently signify-
ing sexual ‘tendencies’ without reference to sexual acts.”).
71. The Importance of Being Earnest: A Trivial Comedy for Serious People was a light comedy
of manners concerning two young women who think themselves engaged to the same non-
existent man.  As with much of Wilde’s work, it satirized late Victorian society and
proprieties.
72. As Christopher Craft explains:
It is one of the bleaker ironies of English literary history that even as Earnest
was brashly entertaining audiences at the St. James Theatre, where it had opened
on 14 February 1895, its author was subjected to a fierce and dogged institutional
chastisement, the prosecution and persecution of the famous trials of 1895.  From
5 April, when Wilde was arrested for “acts of gross indecency with another male
person” until late in the same month, when George Alexander was compelled by
public opinion to remove Earnest from the boards, the two spectacles ran concur-
rently: the one all gay insouciance, the other pure bourgeois retribution; the one
a triumph of evanescent, if not quite indeterminate, signification, the other a
brutal travesty in which the author would be nailed to the specificity of his “acts.”
CRAFT, supra note 11, at 138–39. R
73. See Transgression Under the Skin of Popular Decadence (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author), for an explication of the subversive homosexual punning that runs
through Earnest.
74. FOLDY, supra note 1, at 5. The Picture of Dorian Gray, Wilde’s only novel, involved a R
young man who sells his soul to keep his beauty, living a life of debauchery that is reflected
only in his hidden portrait.
75. KOPELSON, supra note 45, at 31. R
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During the trials, Wilde’s relationship with Lord Alfred Douglas,
his friend and consort, was cleverly recast as evil victimizer and inno-
cent victim.76  As part of his defense in the first libel trial, Douglas’s
father, the Marquis of Queensberry, successfully portrayed his son as a
good young man who had been tempted and nearly ruined by the
seduction of the dissolute Wilde.77  The ultimate success of this tale,
which ended for Wilde in a jail term, excommunication from his wife
and children, and exile, illustrates the pervasiveness of these narra-
tives, their insidious ability to inscribe their meaning on the face of
the law, and their potential to disrupt and ruin homosexual lives.
This particular historical instance of blurred boundaries between nar-
rative and sexual orientation in the law reflects narrative’s hidden role
in the structuring of the act/identity debate.78
One of the earliest instances of the intersection of law, narrative,
and sexual orientation, the Wilde trials set the course for a continuing
interrelation among the three.  The use of these narratives in Wilde’s
trials created a tradition in sexual orientation law: using insidious nar-
ratives to damn the prosecuted while never specifically naming the
actual crimes alleged.79  It is this failure to name, this attempted era-
sure of the very narratives that structured these cases as involving
“crimes against humanity,” that is the legacy of the Wilde trials.80
These politics of homosexual camouflage merged with the obfus-
cated accounts of gross indecency, creating a structural relationship
76. See H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, THE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE 143 (1962).
77. See DOWLING, supra note 48, at 141. Dowling argues that Queensberry concocted R
this “deeply satisfying fiction” to recast himself in the role of affectionate father and Doug-
las in the role of wayward but ultimately moral son. Id.
78. By the act/identity debate I mean the debate still continuing to this very day over
whether homosexuals should be defined by act (that is, acts of sodomy) or by a homosex-
ual identity.
79. To put it another way, as Eskridge does, “law contributed to the construction of the
sexual closet.”  Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1011 (emphasis R
omitted).
80. This refusal to name—the narratological tool that ultimately ruined Wilde—is well
documented in contemporary accounts of the trials.  For example, the London papers, the
primary carriers of narrative in the era, refused to specify what exactly Wilde was being
prosecuted for in his second and third trials—a triumph of inspecificity that still marks our
own grappling with how to label homosexuality. See Central Criminal Court, TIMES
(London), Apr. 26, 1895, at 13 (describing the indictment against Wilde for “acts of gross
indecency”); Central Criminal Court, TIMES (London), May 24, 1895, at 19 (describing the
charges against Wilde for “unlawfully committing certain acts with Charles Parker and Al-
fred Wood, and with certain persons whose names were unknown”).
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between narrative, sexual orientation, and the law.81  Together, they
constructed a homosexual culture of inarticulate identities:
The rhetoric of (and epistemology represented by) “the
Love that dare not speak its name” was the product of centu-
ries of bespeaking sodomitical conduct in terms of an un-
speakable erotic negative: nefandam libidinem, “that sin which
should be neither named nor committed”; the “detestable
and abominable sin, amongst Christians not to be named,”
“things fearful to name,” “the obscene sound of the unbe-
seeming words.”82
At the time of Wilde’s notoriety, these sorts of descriptions of homo-
sexual acts were common, reflecting a dominant ideology that re-
quired homosexuality to “go without saying.”83
The very act of not naming the unspeakable, however, simply
made the unnamed all the more conspicuous: “The very convention
of namelessness thus belies itself, thereby revealing the strategically
foreclosed gap whose very unspeakability is articulated within and by
discourse.  The unspeakable . . . is always spoken by a historically con-
tingent structure of beliefs, institutions, and practices to which the
unspeakable must thereafter refer . . . .”84  Such confusing
smokescreen practices apply to narrative as well as to sexual orienta-
tion.85  Narrative and sexual orientation function as hidden factors
that strongly influence everything around them. Like the love that
“dare not speak its name,” narrative remains the little-seen keystone in
the bridge connecting sexual orientation and the law.
These kinds of rhetorical problems deriving from the recognition
and naming of homosexuality pervade not only the general question
of gay rights but also the rhetoric of the specific legal texts that discuss
81. As Linda Dowling notes, Wilde has come to represent a “name onto which law and
journalism . . . so ceaselessly project their theories and loathing and fears.” DOWLING, supra
note 48, at 153. R
82. KOPELSON, supra note 45, at 158–59 n.14 (citations omitted). R
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. CRAFT, supra note 11, at 6–7 (emphasis added); see also Courtney Megan Cahill, R
(Still) Not Fit To Be Named: Moving Beyond Race to Explain Why “Separate” Nomenclature for Gay
and Straight Relationships Will Never Be “Equal,” 97 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1185 (2009) (discussing an
Illinois court’s explicitly articulated decision not to name sodomy as part of a “well-estab-
lished theological and common law tradition,” and quoting a Tennessee court’s remark
that “[b]ecause ‘everyone knows what a crime against nature is’ when they see it . . . the
crime itself need not be ‘spell[ed] out’” (second alteration in original)).
85. See generally GERALD PRINCE, NARRATOLOGY: THE FORM AND FUNCTIONING OF NARRA-
TIVE 36–37 (1982) (discussing the importance of implicitly communicated information to
narrative and noting that “the retrieval of implicit information often depends on opera-
tions involving knowledge of the world, of social customs, of rhetorical or generic conven-
tions, etc.”).
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and adjudicate those rights.86  If we interpret “rhetorical” in the
broadest possible fashion, that is, to mean language in general, then
we see that understanding the current relationship between sexual
orientation and the law requires us to first explore the narratives, legal
and otherwise, that create and support our understanding of sexual-
ity.  This is an important task because, as Laurence Tribe has argued
in relation to Lawrence v. Texas, “[t]rying to make sense of the conclu-
sions judges have reached by attending carefully to the rulings they
have actually rendered in the name of substantive due process
reveals . . . very different narrative[s].”87  It is the work of these hidden
narratives that I hope to expose and to explore in this Article.
III. A HISTORY OF OBSCURITY: THE SLIPPAGE OF IDENTITY
NARRATIVES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY LAW
“Interpretative disputes most often arise precisely when there is
no . . . common reading.”88
Homosexuality, obscure and ambiguous since its “creation,”89 re-
sists simple classification.90  So, too, do its narratives.91  Slippery, com-
plex, and alternately multivalent or criminally singular, the modality
of gay narrative is difficult to contain or constrain, particularly when
these narratives enter the legal arena.  Hidden or unnamed, these
narratives remain unchanged in large part from their Wildean ante-
cedents and continue to structure the way the law regulates sexual
identity.92
Faced with this multiplicity of narratives, however, we often have
a deep desire to systematize.  When these narratives are introduced
into legal texts, so often used to reify and to order, the Linnaen93 urge
86. Schneyer, supra note 36, at 1316; see also, e.g., Cahill, supra note 84, at 1185 (discuss- R
ing the approaches of two American courts to the issue).
87. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897–98 (2004).
88. Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux, Preface to INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE:
A HERMENEUTIC READER, at ix, xii (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).
89. See supra notes 36–50 and accompanying text. R
90. See, e.g., Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 800–01 (1979) (illustrating difficulties
identifying what the term “homosexual” entails and using “sexual acts,” rather than iden-
tity, to define the term).
91. See, e.g., CRAFT, supra note 11, at 46 (explaining “the critical and taxonomic prob- R
lem of whether [Tennyson’s] In Memoriam ‘can properly be termed homosexual’”).
92. See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 84, at 1184–86 (tracing Sir William Blackstone’s eight- R
eenth century understanding of sodomy as “‘a crime not fit to be named’” through then-
Chief Justice Burger’s 1986 concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
93. Carl Linnaeus classified all animals, insects, and plants into one vast orderly net-
work.  Editorial, The Legacy of Linnaeus, NATURE, Mar. 15, 2007, at 231, 231.
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is uncontrollable.  As Gerald Prince explains, Roland Barthes de-
scribed the very same urge for order in narratology:
[W]henever we read a narrative, we organize it and interpret
it according to several codes or sub-codes: a linguistic code
and a cultural code, of course; but also a hermeneutic code,
in terms of which certain parts of a given text function as an
enigma to be solved and certain others as a solution to that
enigma, or the beginning of a solution, or a false
solution . . . .94
As articulated by Prince, Barthes’s theory explains the difficulty faced
by courts encountering the multiplicity of narratives present in many
sexual orientation cases.  The primary difficulty is in deciphering the
strategies courts use to “solve” the “enigma” of gay rights.
How do courts interpret the texts of amended constitutions, the
testimony of expert witnesses, and the substance of amicus curiae
briefs?  How, in other words, are all these indeterminate legal narra-
tives read and understood?  As Prince argues, “In any narrative com-
munication, it is not the narrative code as a whole—whatever it may
be—which intervenes but rather what the sender and the receiver
have assimilated of the code and, more particularly, what each has
selected from his personal stock to encode or decode the message.”95
Applying this approach to sexual orientation law, the interpretation of
anti-sodomy statutes—whether viewed as straightforward or rife with
ambiguity—is clearly a function of context and of the interpreter’s
personal stock stories.96
Many of these stock stories, of course, rely on a discourse shaped
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.97  This discourse
relied on
[T]hemes of sodomy (criminal acts), inversion (violation of
social gender norms), and sexual psychopathy (dangerous
and uncontrollable desires) to produce a mythic figure—
The Homosexual—who could be regulated for any of three
94. PRINCE, supra note 85, at 106–07. R
95. Id. at 108.
96. I borrow the phrase “stock stories” from Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Opposition-
ists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2421–22 (1989) (suggesting that
when a person “picks and chooses from . . . available facts to present a picture of what
happened,” his interpretation, or “stock story[,] is not the only one that can be told”).
97. See FOLDY, supra note 1, at 83, 91 (describing how certain individuals in the mid- R
nineteenth century sought to describe and “understand[ ] the confusing phenomenon of
same-sex passion,” and highlighting one individual’s assertion that the Wilde trials “created
a public image for the ‘homosexual’” (quoting JEFFREY WEEKS, SEX, POLITICS & SOCIETY 103
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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reasons: committing illegal acts, challenging gender roles as-
sociated with her or his sex, or having specified sexual
desires, or “homosexual tendencies.”98
Stock stories, of course, are populated by stock characters. In Morphol-
ogy of the Folktale, Victor Propp studied the Russian fairy tale, applying
the orthodox formalist method to a structural analysis of the fairy
tale.99  If we borrow from Propp’s “functionalist” view of narrative
structure, we can identify similar stock characters in the stories told in
legal opinions.  Although Propp identifies seven “dramatis personae”
in all fairy tales, such as “The Villain,” “The Hero,” and “The Princess
and Her Father,”100 the gay stock stories used in “sexual orientation”
opinions produce “The Evil Seducer of Children,”101 “The Morally
Corrupt,”102 “The Sexual Deviant,”103 and “The Easily Susceptible to
Blackmail.”104  It is the courts’ reliance on these fundamentally
98. Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1069. R
99. At the end of his book, Propp uses a quote from Alexander Veselo´vsky’s Poe`tika to
make the point that even the most complicated narrative simplifies with the distance of
time:
Is it permissible in this field also to consider the problem of typical schemes . . .
schemes handed down for generations as ready-made formulae capable of becom-
ing animated with a new mood, giving rise to new formations? . . . Contemporary
narrative literature, with its complicated thematic structure and photographic re-
production of reality apparently eliminates the very possibility of such a question.
But when this literature will appear to future generations as distant as antiquity,
from prehistoric to medieval times, seems to us at present—when the synthesis of
time, that great simplifier, in passing over the complexity of phenomena, reduces
them to the magnitude of points receding into the distance, then their lines will
merge with those which we are now uncovering when we look back at the poetic
traditions of the distant past—and the phenomena of schematism and repetition
will then be established across the total expanse.
V. PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLKTALE 116 (2d ed. 1968) (alterations in original).
Extending Propp’s idea to the legal context carries great appeal.  From a great chronologi-
cal distance, reconsidering old statutes and opinions along formulaic lines could achieve a
greater understanding of them.  Specifically, I hope to use the tropes of the Wilde prosecu-
tions to identify the basic narrative deployed to justify discrimination and homophobia in
American legal rhetoric.
100. Id. at 79–80 (listing seven “spheres of action” present in fairy tales).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Carlson, 236 F. Supp. 2d 686, 690 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(describing a U.S. Customs Agent’s baseless stereotyping that the Internet chat room in
question was frequented by “homosexual men interested in young boys”).
102. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But the
society that eliminates criminal punishment for homosexual acts does not necessarily aban-
don the view that homosexuality is morally wrong and socially harmful . . . .”).
103. See, e.g., Dahl v. Sec’y of U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (quot-
ing a Department of Defense report noting “the fearful imagery of homosexuals polluting
the social environment with unrestrained and wanton expressions of deviant sexuality”).
104. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“In 1982, the
Department of Defense issued a policy mandating dismissal of homosexuals in part ‘to
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homophobic stock characters that taints their opinions, clouds their
judgment, and engenders a backlash against homosexuals.105
Further, the courts’ reliance on these stock characters in legal
texts can leave space for them to insert their own vision of
homophobic horrors.  Peter Brooks, in his discussion of narrative
functioning, argues that “narrative stories depend on meanings
delayed, partially filled in, stretched out.”106  The legal world func-
tions with only partial knowledge about homosexuality, but it acts—
and rules—as to homosexuality despite this limited and confined un-
derstanding.  This constricted paradigm has disastrous ramifications
for the gay rights movement as a whole.
Ultimately, legal definition of gay and lesbian rights often be-
comes a question of narrative interpretation.107  As Gerald Prince
prevent breaches of security’ that presumably would arise if a closeted homosexual were
blackmailed.”), vacated, 88 F.3d 1280, 1300 (2d Cir. 1996).
105. See, for example, COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30b (providing “no protected status” for
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual individuals and commonly referred to as “Amendment
2”), invalidated by Romer, 517 U.S. 620; Oregon’s unsuccessful Proposition 9, PHIL KIESLING,
SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTERS’ PAMPHLET (Nov. 3, 1992) (requiring the government to discourage
homosexuality); and Cincinnati’s Article XII, distinguished from Colorado’s unconstitu-
tional section 30b in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289, 296–97 (6th Cir. 1997) (barring “homosexuals, as homosexuals, from obtaining
special privileges and preferences”), but later repealed by voters, Gregory Korte, Idea Shift
Deep-Sixed Article XII, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 7, 2004, at A1.
106. PETER BROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT: DESIGN AND INTENTION IN NARRATIVE 21
(1992). The observation concludes a discussion of Barthes’s S/Z.  Barthes sets up a situa-
tion we constantly encounter when reading the “sexual orientation” opinions: the “deja-
lu,” or the already read and written.  As Brooks points out,
The text is seen as a texture or weaving of codes (using the etymological sense of
“text”) which the reader organizes and sorts out only in provisional ways, since he
never can master it completely, indeed is himself in part “undone” in his effort to
unravel the text. . . .  In other words . . . the possibility of following a narrative and
making sense of it . . . belong[s] to the reader’s literary competence, his training
as a reader of narrative. The reader is in this view himself virtually a text, a composite of
all that he has read, or heard read, or imagined as written.
Id. at 18–19 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  This last phrase is particularly resonant
because, in many ways, it is what the legal world has imagined as written that determines
their outcomes.  Specifically, it is what these courts have imagined sodomy and homosexual-
ity to mean that has structured their responses to the gay-rights initiatives.
107. The question of interpretation in legal texts has been a contested one.  Compare
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, in LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER,
supra note 88, at 229, 239 (arguing that “the objective character of legal interpretation R
[does not] arise from agreement” over the text’s prescriptive values but from “disciplining
rules”), with Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (1984) (arguing that
Fiss’s reliance on “‘disciplining rules’” to direct legal interpretation “will not do” because
“they themselves [are not] available or ‘readable’ independently of interpretation”).  In
addition to Owen Fiss and Stanley Fish, such legal luminaries as Patricia Williams and Rich-
ard Delgado have also jumped into the fray. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY
OF RACE AND RIGHTS 138–39 (1991) (“[T]he word of law . . . is a subcategory of the underly-
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writes, “[A] passage can function hermeneutically if it encourages
questions about the identity of someone or something . . ., for exam-
ple through a term whose reference is unknown.”108  A passage such
as the anti-sodomy law at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick, for example,
functions hermeneutically in this way, as it brings into play the inter-
pretative morass of homosexual identity at the very site of attempted
definition and enclosure.109  This uncertainty and confusion over sex-
ual identity in the law—this contested narrative—still shapes and
structures the legal debate about homosexuality.
A. From Wilde to Bowers v. Hardwick: The Legal Crystallization of
Act into Identity
The ordering of homosexual acts into identity, first articulated in
the late nineteenth century during a major sexual paradigm shift,110
continues to structure the legal system’s understanding of sexual ori-
entation, even in the twenty-first century.  Then, as now, the law bi-
sects act and identity into two separate and opposing categories111:
those of oppressive, limited interpretation (act) versus those of fluid,
ing social motives and beliefs from which it is born.  It is the technical embodiment of
attempts to order society according to a consensus of ideals.  When a society loses sight of
those ideals and grants obeisance to words alone, law becomes sterile and formalistic; lex is
applied without jus and is therefore unjust.”); Richard Delgado, Where Is My Body? Stanley
Fish’s Long Goodbye to Law, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1370, 1370–71 (2001) (reviewing STANLEY FISH,
THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (1999), and “recommend[ing] a pragmatic, anti-normative
approach [to legal discourse], similar to Fish’s, but applied more broadly”).  The result is
that the hermeneutics of legal narratives is still a matter of debate.  Yet whether or not one
agrees with Stanley Fish’s ultimate thesis, he makes a critical point regarding the ultimate
“objectivity” of legal tools:
The content of the law, even when its manifestation is a statute that seems to be
concerned with only the most technical and mechanical of matters (taxes, for
example), is always some social, moral, political, or religious vision; and when
someone objects to a decision “on the basis of some ethical or religious princi-
ple,” his objection is not “external” to the law . . . but represents an effort to alter
the law, so that one’s understanding of what was internal to it would be different.
Fish, supra, at 1337.  When applied to a statute that clearly is not “concerned with only the
most technical and mechanical of matters”—Colorado’s Amendment 2, for example—the
social, moral, and/or religious visions behind such referendums matter all the more.
108. PRINCE, supra note 85, at 107. R
109. The state law in question made it a crime punishable by up to twenty years in
prison to “‘perform[ ] or submit[ ] to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one per-
son and the mouth or anus of another.’”  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1
(1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-
2 (1984)).
110. See supra Part II.
111. See Halley, supra note 6, at 1722 (“The duality of the sodomy statutes—sometimes R
an index of identity, sometimes an index of acts—is a rhetorical mechanism in the subordi-
nation of homosexual identity and the superordination of heterosexual identity.”).
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multivalent interpretation (identity).  The shift from what once was a
multiple, flexible category of sexuality to a stringent and rigid singu-
larity of a gay act occurred simultaneously with the definition and clas-
sification of (homo)sexual identity:
What for centuries had been thought of as a multivalent sex-
ual flux, a polytropic wandering inherent in all flesh, in every
body, would be effectively arrested by a kind of taxonomic
freeze-framing; the fluid vagrancies of the flesh would be
crystallized into discrete and hermetic categories, especially
into sexualities whose disjunctiveness would be determined
along the axis of object choice: either the homo or the
hetero. . . .  [T]he binarism . . . would help shape modern
being and culture; it worked to fashion the reality it would
then go on to describe.112
Thus, although the end of the nineteenth century shifted from an
acts-based definition of gayness (sodomy) to a definition based on
identity, this shift certainly did not result in more freedom for those
attracted to the same sex.113  By the 1920s, as Eskridge has pointed
out, a shift in how same-sex relationships were perceived occurred: “If
the first shift was from the sinful sodomite to the degenerate invert, the
second was from the degenerate invert to the psychopathic homosexual.”114
This new binary categorization—homosexual versus heterosex-
ual—attempted to control the new homosexual identity by shrinking
it to “discrete and hermetic categories.”115  In other words, along with
the identification of sexuality as the defining personal characteristic,
an ironically limiting definition was forged, based on an all-encom-
passing general identity—“homosexual”—which was still essentially
(and negatively) defined by acts.  These acts (and their actor) were
now doubly cursed: They were not only traditionally, biblically sinful
but also different and other.116
112. CRAFT, supra note 11, at 5. R
113. See Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1029–30 (noting a correla- R
tion between broadened crime-against-nature laws and drastically increased arrest rates,
and suggesting that both phenomena were “part of a larger social process—social coercion
against people with gender-bending and inverted sexual tastes”).
114. Id. at 1054.
115. CRAFT, supra note 11, at 5. R
116. And possibly, if one followed Freud, they were also dangerous and predatory. See
Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1063 (explaining that “American doc- R
tors in the 1920s combined some features of Freud’s thought with entrenched ideas they
had elaborated from Krafft-Ebing and the eugenics (antidegeneracy) movement” and that
“the homosexual was the quintessential psychopath, for he was by Freudian definition a
man whose sexual development had been derailed, rendering him intrinsically
perverted”).
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As the twentieth century dawned, American courts began to be a
bit more explicit about what, precisely, the “unmentionable conduct”
in a “crime of nature” might entail.  Although still remaining ambigu-
ously flexible, the terms were fleshed out a bit by state statutes and
opinions detailing what was forbidden sexual conduct and which body
parts were suspect.117  As the century progressed, homosexuality be-
came increasingly associated with acts of sodomy, and the identifica-
tion and demonization of homosexuals continued apace.118
Combined with Freudian discourse, which labeled the homosexual
male as a “sexual psychopath,” this association led to increasing regu-
lation and criminalization of male-on-male acts of oral and anal
sodomy.119
Thus the late nineteenth and twentieth century definition of ho-
mosexual, neither quite act nor identity, did not successfully crystal-
lize sexual preference.  On the contrary, the notion of the
homosexual persona as shaped by acts of sodomy only led to newly
oppressive dynamics within the legal arena.  These dynamics took
center stage in the American legal world when the battle for sexual
privacy and the right to same-sex intimacy began in the latter part of
the twentieth century.
By the 1970s, many states stopped arresting individuals for con-
sensual sodomy.120  This was not true in the South, however, where
states continued to apprehend and prosecute men for homosexual
intimacy, whether public or private.121  This practice was confirmed
and validated by the Supreme Court of the United States’s 1986 ruling
in Bowers v. Hardwick.122
In ruling on a facial challenge to a gender neutral statute that
never specifically mentioned homosexuality, the Court relied on a
117. See Eskridge, Historiography, supra note 39, at 658–59 (explaining how courts and R
state legislatures broadened the definition of sodomy to include oral sex, eventually speci-
fying what body parts could be involved, the relationship of the parties, and the circum-
stances of the crime).
118. See id. at 659 (“The main transformation was an explicit association of sodomy (the
act) with homosexuality (the status)—and the association of both with child molestation
(act) and sexual psychopathy (status).”).
119. See id. at 660 (“Reflecting concepts about sexuality propounded by the American
followers of Freud, regulators focused their concern on the ‘sexual psychopath’—the ag-
gressive male who could not control his impulses and threatened children.  The homosex-
ual male was identified as the quintessential sexual psychopath, and regulatory attention
was sharply focused on this new creature.”).
120. Id. at 664–65.
121. Id. at 665.
122. See generally 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003).
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stringently anti-gay narrative, one built on “sheer bad scholarship,”123
to criminalize homosexual sodomy.124  The basis of the Hardwick
Court’s opinion and understanding of same-sex intimacy was the ellip-
tical, demonizing narratives born in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.125  The narratives in Hardwick provided a direct
link to those articulated in the Wilde trials, relying on one act (sod-
omy) to define an entire sexual identity (homosexuality), while insist-
ing that this sexual identity never be defined.126  As in the Wilde trials,
the Hardwick Court carefully crafted its opinion around a negative
space, helping define heterosexual identity by what it was not.127
The bifurcation between act and identity endorsed by the Hard-
wick Court set a damaging course for the legal future of gay rights and
the possibility of securing protected status.  The story underlying the
Hardwick Court’s ruling is a familiar tale of reductionism, limited iden-
tity, and abbreviated rights—tales seen in the narratives born out of
the Wilde trials.  By reducing all possible facets of homosexuality into
one act and one word—sodomy—the Hardwick Court quashed gays
back into the old mold, one that defined same-sex acts as both a gen-
eral “gross indecency” and a singular horror.  In other words, Hard-
wick exemplifies “how modern prejudice against gay people seizes
upon their presumptive commission of sodomy and totalizes their
identity around those acts.”128
In doing so, the Court managed to tidily erase all components of
gay identity, using the ambiguous but familiar rubric of “unmentiona-
ble acts.”  What was left was only a narrow frame of reference: Hard-
wick’s majority opinion used the front of fundamental rights to
camouflage their reliance on homophobic narratives, narratives pur-
portedly illustrating the “ancient roots”129 and fundamental “moral-
123. Halley, supra note 6, at 1752. R
124. The statute at issue provided, in relevant part: “ ‘A person commits the offense of
sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another.’” Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1 (quoting GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).  Writing for the majority, Justice White rejected the respon-
dent’s due process claims, which Justice White explained were “at best, facetious” given the
“ancient roots” of prohibitions against sodomy. Id. at 192, 194.
125. See Eskridge, Construction of the Closet, supra note 14, at 1107 (“The ‘roots’ of the R
[Hardwick] Court’s focus on homosexuality were . . . the antifeminist movement and the
eugenic sexologists of the period between 1880 and 1946.”).
126. In other words, the Hardwick Court refused to define homosexuality as a sexual
identity per se, basing its definition solely on sexual acts.
127. For example, in discussing the reach of its precedent, the Court noted that homo-
sexuality had no connection to family, marriage, or procreation. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
128. Eskridge, Historiography, supra note 39, at 634. R
129. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.
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ity”130 of their reasoning.  This reliance on homophobic narratives was
most starkly exposed when the Court refused to assert “a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy” since it would theoretically
then need to protect other sexual crimes, such as adultery and in-
cest.131  This kind of reasoning is the bastard child of Krafft-Ebbing’s
prose, which associated inverts with various other sexual deviants.132
Further, by using a flawed history of sodomy as the primary sup-
port for its reductionism, the Court effectively based its anti-sodomy
argument on an inarticulate and incorrect narrative.133  The “‘crime
not fit to be named’”134 was deliberately misnamed in Hardwick, as the
Court reduced a broad understanding of sodomy (that is, acts per-
formed by all sexual orientations) and of homosexuality (that is, an
orientation that encompasses more than acts) into one simplified
formula: sodomy is equal to homosexuality.135  As Janet Halley ar-
gued, in Hardwick sodomy is the “metonym” for the homosexual.136
All of this misnaming is facilitated by the refusal to acknowledge
the hidden narrative: “Obscurity is part of what sodomy is, a means by
which it attains its social effects.”137  The obscured and invisible narra-
130. Id. at 196.
131. Id. at 191, 195–96.
132. See supra notes 40–50 and accompanying text. R
133. The history used in Hardwick was provided by the University of Miami Law Review’s
Survey on the Law, which incorrectly portrayed an essential part of the history of sodomy,
thus creating an unreliable narrative.  See Halley, supra note 6, at 1751–53 & nn.89–91 R
(citing Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521 (1986)).  Halley notes that this “survey” of
sodomy was, in actuality, a conflation of old and new sodomy laws and accuses the Court of
exploiting this problematic secondary source to bolster its “ancient roots” of sodomy argu-
ment. See id. at 1751–53 & n.91.
134. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1612 (Philadelphia, Rees Welsh & Co.
1897)).
135. For example, in responding to an argument that, “[e]ven if the conduct at issue
here is not a fundamental right, . . . there must be a rational basis for the law and that
there is none in this case other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in
Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable,” the Court wrote, “[I]f all
laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process
Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.  Even respondent makes no such claim, but
insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inade-
quate.  We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States
should be invalidated on this basis.” Id. at 196 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
136. Halley, supra note 6, at 1737. R
137. Id. at 1757.  Critically, Halley identifies one of the key points about these sexual-
legal texts when she castigates the slippery motives of the Hardwick Justices.  She points out
that “[f]ramed as a case about mere bodily acts and not messy, contested, relentlessly politi-
cal identities, Hardwick purports to take the Justices out of politics.” Id. at 1767.  Halley
rightfully disdains the Court’s attempt to reduce multiple interpretations to a tidy act, to
eliminate the “messy” and uncontrollable stories supporting contemporary gay identity.
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tive of sodomy, its refusal to tell the whole truth about homosexuality,
has all the more meaning for its absence.  Only when we uncover the
misnamed, falsified, and truncated narratives lurking under the sur-
face of fundamental rights rhetoric, like that articulated in Hardwick,
will a reasoned discussion of sexual identity ever be possible.
B. Romer v. Evans: Structuring Hardwick’s Absence
The Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans, striking down a
Colorado referendum (“Amendment 2”)138 that prohibited state or
local governments from extending civil rights protections to persons
on the basis of sexual orientation,139 was a victory for gay advocacy.140
But a careful look at Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion shows not
only a cautious avoidance of the status/conduct issues discussed above
(in part to sidestep any discussion of Hardwick) but also the bypassing
of the specifics of homosexuality.141 Romer fits into the Wildean frame
because it reduced the modalities of gay multiplicity down to a single
act (sodomy)142 and continued to use homosexuality to define and
distinguish the parameters of heterosexuality.143
Disinclined to explore the boundaries of gay identity, the Court
relied “upon the authoritative construction of Colorado’s Supreme
Court,” which provided only “a modest reading of [Amendment 2’s]
implications,”144 finding it “unnecessary to determine the full extent
And if we understand “politics” to mean the body politic itself, Halley’s point provides an
encapsulation of the dangers hidden within the act/identity dyad and the importance of
laying this architecture bare.
138. COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30b.  The constitutional amendment is commonly referred
to as “Amendment 2.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
139. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24, 635–36.
140. See, e.g., David W. Dunlap, The Gay Rights Ruling: In Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
1996, at 21 (quoting Suzanne B. Goldberg, a member of the prevailing legal team, as say-
ing that Romer “is the most important victory ever for lesbian and gay rights”).
141. The Court uses the phrase “gays and lesbians” throughout its opinion, but the only
plausible attempt to explicate those terms and their cognates is in the Court’s citation to
two Colorado municipal ordinances respectively defining “sexual orientation” as “the
choice of sexual partners, i.e., bisexual, homosexual, or heterosexual” and “[t]he status of
an individual as to his or her heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality.” Romer, 517
U.S. at 624 (alteration in original) (quoting BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 12-1-1 (1987);
DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE, art. IV, § 28-92 (1991)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
142. Though the word “sodomy” does not appear in the Court’s majority opinion, its
invocation of “sexual partners” vis-a`-vis the municipal ordinances imports the question of
act into the discussion.
143. This point is implicit in the Court’s repeated invocation of “gays and lesbians,”
which, when used to refer to a discrete group of people, necessarily stands in opposition to
a discrete group of heterosexuals.
144. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626.
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of the amendment’s reach.”145  Although the Court strongly disap-
proved of the animosity-driven amendment,146 it declined to extend
itself to the critical issues “lurking beneath” its creation and enact-
ment.147  In this way, Romer also follows the Wilde script, as the Court
failed to reject the old nineteenth century narratives lurking below
the surface of the Colorado referendum.
The Court’s refusal to engage in the more fundamental de-
bates—for example, whether gays are a suspect class, what the legal
contours of homosexuality should be, whose narratological view
should triumph—is troubling, as it turns a blind eye not only to the
status/conduct battle raging in the lower courts148 but also to its own
contrary decision eleven years prior in Bowers v. Hardwick.149  The
Court’s move towards establishing a paradigm of gay rights should be
commended, but at the same time it should be recognized as only a
small step.
In striking down Amendment 2, the Supreme Court, like the Col-
orado courts, continued to use the obscuring shield of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.150  Here, however, the Court did not try to fabricate a
fundamental right, nor did it designate homosexuality a suspect classi-
fication.  Instead, the Court brought out the deus ex machina, the tradi-
tionally harmless rational basis review.151  In a virtually unprecedented
move, the Court front loaded the meaning of this typically deferential
basis of review, using it to quash the amendment without resorting to
inventing fundamental rights, involving itself in the conduct/status
145. Id.
146. Id. at 632 (“[Amendment 2’s] sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the
class it affects . . . .”).
147. But see Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 203, 207, 224–25 (1996) (arguing that Justice Kennedy identified and addressed the
substantive inequality “lurking beneath” the formal inequality of Amendment 2).
148. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
826–27 (11th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing a prohibition of adoption by homosexuals from
the amendment at issue in Romer on the ground that the former encompassed only con-
duct while the latter encompassed both conduct and homosexual status).
149. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The case most relevant to the
issue before [the Court] today is not even mentioned in the Court’s opinion: . . . Bowers v.
Hardwick . . . .”).
150. Id. at 635–36 (majority opinion) (holding that “Amendment 2 violates the Equal
Protection Clause”).
151. Id. at 631–32.
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debate, or singling out homosexuality as a class in need of protec-
tion.152  This was a brilliant, although tremendously evasive, move.
In avoiding the conduct/status quagmire and its own decision in
Hardwick, and by focusing instead on the “animus” underlying passage
of Amendment 2, the Court managed to sidestep entirely any discus-
sion of homosexuality.  To put it another way, the Court’s rhetoric of
avoidance allowed it to provide a negative definition of homosexual-
ity—rendering it once again, the sin that must not be named.  Fur-
thermore, the Court’s avoidance of Hardwick served to broaden the
gap in its jurisprudence; though the Court struck down Amendment 2
in part because the animus behind it was not rational, the Court never
really attacked the sentiment that spurred the animus to begin with:
the hatred of gay rights, the protection of the gay person, and the
homosexual persona itself.153  By carefully avoiding any specificity be-
yond a disapproval of “animus,” the Court fell into the old Wilde trials
routine of ruling around homosexuality—just like it ruled around
Hardwick.  While Amendment 2 no longer stands, homosexuality re-
mains a negative space.
Throughout the opinion, the Court made clear its refusal to lend
a hand to the project of defining homosexuality.154  As Justice Scalia
pointed out in his dissent, “The case most relevant to the issue before
us today is not even mentioned in the Court’s opinion.”155  The
Court’s discussion of the “animus” underlying the amendment’s en-
actment and its careful dancing around Hardwick ultimately illumi-
nated the contours of gayness by highlighting its very emptiness.
Once again, the Court sculpted the understanding of homosexuality
by rhetorical avoidance.
The Court’s analysis of Amendment 2 identified as problematic
the amendment’s use of a narrow definition of homosexuality to deny
152. See id. at 632–33 (explaining that “Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of
judicial review” even under “the most deferential of standards” because “[i]t identifies per-
sons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board”).
153. The closest the Court comes to broaching that topic is its acknowledgement that
“[t]he impetus for the amendment and the contentious campaign that preceded its adop-
tion came in large part from ordinances that had been passed in various Colorado munici-
palities” that protected against discrimination by reason of sexual orientation. Id. at
623–24.
154. In other words, the Court’s rationale takes as given the class named by the amend-
ment (homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals) and confines its discussion to equal protec-
tion jurisprudence. See id. at 624, 631 (“To the contrary, the amendment imposes a special
disability upon those persons alone.  Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that
others enjoy or may seek without constraint.”).
155. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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gays a spectrum of benefits.156  It is this definition of homosexuality, as
we have seen before, that is the contested article between battling her-
meneutics: the homophobic singularity of homosexual conduct versus
the efflorescence of gay multiplicity, the classification of all homosex-
uals as “sodomites” versus the various broadened understandings of
gay identity.157  By recognizing, however unknowingly, this battle over
identity—a fight over the interpretation of not only Amendment 2 but
of the legal understanding of homosexuality—the Court implicitly
criticized the anti-gay rights crowd:
[Amendment 2] is at once too narrow and too broad.  It
identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them pro-
tection across the board.  The resulting disqualification of a
class of persons from the right to seek specific protection
from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence.158
By honing in on the contradiction inherent in the language of
Amendment 2—that it defines homosexuality by a single trait but
does not acknowledge a multiplicity of homosexual variety—the
Court, unwittingly or not, positioned itself squarely in the midst of the
conduct/identity debate.  While carefully striking down Amendment
2 on the basis of irrationality, the Court stumbled upon the difficult
issue of defining homosexuality that has plagued the courts since the
Wilde trials: the inability of containment.  What the Wilde trials tried
to do, what both Hardwick and Amendment 2 attempted, and what
Romer inadvertently did was to collapse the nuances of homosexuality
into a small box, one that can be variously referred to as “gross inde-
cency,” “sodomy,” and in Romer “homosexual persons.”159
In each case, the containment failed.  The Romer Court, though
acknowledging that the amendment’s unprecedented unfairness
spelled its demise, nevertheless tried to avoid stamping its imprimatur
on such an indeterminate, noncontainable group by taking refuge in
rational review.  Unable to fit homosexuality into the box that con-
tains other, more suspect classifications—such as race, national origin,
or ethnicity160—the Court effectively gave up on homosexuality, strik-
ing down the offending amendment but refusing to grant the group
156. Id. at 633 (majority opinion).
157. See supra notes 78, 118, 142 and accompanying text. R
158. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
159. Id. at 625.
160. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995).
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suspect status or even to note that homosexuals as a group deserve any
sort of increased protection.161
The Court’s reliance on irrationality and animus ensured that
while this particular legislation was struck down, the rest of the Wilde
script would remain the same.  Such are the downsides of a legal sys-
tem wedded to categorization: Only those groups that neatly fit into
the prefitted slots merit any sort of heightened protection.162  Courts
have always avoided homosexuality, with its infinite varieties, precisely
because of its inability to withstand social and legal control.
The Court’s discussion of Davis v. Beason163 trod nearest to the
hermeneutics of conduct and status and came closest to commenting
on Hardwick.  Distinguishing polygamy from sodomy, the Romer Court
practically suggested that sodomy should not be considered a crime,
in the same way as having multiple wives:
In Davis, the Court approved an Idaho territorial statute de-
nying Mormons, polygamists, and advocates of polygamy the
right to vote and to hold office because, as the Court con-
strued the statute, it “simply excludes from the privilege of
voting, or of holding any office of honor, trust or profit,
those who have been convicted of certain offences, and those
who advocate a practical resistance to the laws of the Terri-
tory and justify and approve the commission of crimes forbidden by
it.” . . .  To the extent [Davis] held that the groups desig-
nated in the statute may be deprived of the right to vote be-
cause of their status, its ruling could not stand without
surviving strict scrutiny, a most doubtful outcome.164
Although the Court struck down the Davis law insofar as it excluded
from voting those who merely advocate the practice of polygamy,165 it
did not do the same for polygamists themselves—clearly indicating
that it still considered polygamy a crime.166  By distinguishing Amend-
161. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36 (striking down the amendment, not because of anything
intrinsic to homosexuals as a group, but because “Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not
to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else” (emphasis
added)).
162. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . .  The
general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin.”
(emphasis added)).
163. 133 U.S. 333 (1890), abrogated by Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
164. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Davis, 133
U.S. at 347).
165. Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam)).
166. See id. (“To the extent Davis held that a convicted felon may be denied the right to
vote, its holding is not implicated by our decision and is unexceptionable.” (citing Richard-
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ment 2 from the Davis statute and by striking it down for its broad
denial of the laws to homosexuals, the Court suggested that homosex-
uality—and therefore sodomy—was no longer the crime it once
was.167
It is also important to note, however, that the Court never had
the same problem with polygamy that it has always had with homosex-
uality, namely, the inability to constrain and control. While polygamy,
like homosexuality, was seen as a dangerous force undermining the
bonds of family, marriage, and the general structure of society,168 the
ability of multiple marriages to be defined meant that a successful war
could be waged against this practice.169  Thus, to measure homosexu-
ality against polygamy, thereby measuring Hardwick against Davis (as
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer tried to do170), is ultimately a lost
cause, as these two “threats” against the family are too dissimilar to
offer a compelling comparison.
The Romer Court came quite close to commenting on the defini-
tion of homosexuality but instead took refuge in the Equal Protection
Clause171:  “Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that gov-
ernment and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all
son v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)); id. at 650 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But the proposition
that polygamy can be criminalized, and those engaging in that crime deprived of the vote,
remains good law.” (citing Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53)).  In Richardson, the Court upheld a
state law disenfranchising felons, using the Davis Court’s upholding of polygamist disen-
franchisement as precedent for its decision.  418 U.S. at 53.
167. The use of the law to punish both polygamists and homosexuals can be traced to
the Victorian need to control and contain those forces that threatened to destabilize tradi-
tional myths about marriage and family. See generally JILL L. MATUS, UNSTABLE BODIES: VIC-
TORIAN REPRESENTATIONS OF SEXUALITY AND MATERNITY (1995).  For a comprehensive look
at anti-polygamy sentiment and the crusade to legally reinforce monogamy as the only
form of marriage, see generally Sarah Barringer Gordon, “Our National Hearthstone”: Anti-
Polygamy Fiction and the Sentimental Campaign Against Moral Diversity in Antebellum America, 8
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (1996).
168. See Gordon, supra note 167, at 298 (“As [one anti-polygamist author] put it, polyg- R
amy threatened ‘our national hearthstone,’ and undermined marriage in the rest of the
country, ‘corrupting the very fount of virtue and purity,’ thus destroying the ‘home of
liberty.’”).
169. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164, 166 (1878) (upholding a law
prohibiting polygamy and noting that “[a]t common law, the second marriage was always
void” and “treated as an offence against society”).
170. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 648–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It remains to be explained
how [the Idaho statute disenfranchising polygamists] was not an ‘impermissible targeting’
of polygamists, but (the much more mild) Amendment 2 is an ‘impermissible targeting’ of
homosexuals.”).
171. For an analysis of the danger of overusing the Equal Protection Clause to strike
down outdated or bad amendments, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 20 (1987).
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who seek its assistance.”172  Instead of striking down Amendment 2 for
its constraint of homosexuality to a single act or for its contradictory
use of breadth and narrowness of gay status, the Court found that the
Amendment failed the rational basis test, a prong of equal protection
analysis that rarely has bite173:
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conven-
tional [rational basis] inquiry.
. . . .
We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homo-
sexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else.  This Colorado cannot do.  A
State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws.174
Although the Court considered endorsing the multiplicity of gay iden-
tity in its discussion of Davis, thus validating the inclusive stories told
by Queer Advocacy, it drew back in the end.  Striking down Amend-
ment 2 was a step in the right direction, but it was only a beginning.
C. Lawrence v. Texas: Interpretative Uncertainty, Narrative Woes
Like Romer, Lawrence v. Texas spelled a positive outcome for gay
rights,175 but this outcome ironically continued to perpetuate the nar-
rative that homosexual acts denoted homosexual identity.176  The
Lawrence Court did, finally, reject some of the old, poisonous Wildean
narratives,177 but it continued to rely on the shrunken space that re-
172. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
173. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) (describ-
ing “ordinary rational basis review” as “tantamount to a free pass for legislation”).
174. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635.
175. There has been great scholarly debate over the meaning of Lawrence and whether it
qualifies as a victory for gay rights. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, Lawrence v. Texas and the
New Law of Gay Rights, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 189 (2004) (suggesting two alternative,
conflicting ways of describing Lawrence); Tribe, supra note 87, at 1949 (opining that Law- R
rence’s principles are readily applicable to same-sex marriage and “to the entire public
realm of how gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and the differently gendered are treated in housing,
employment, adoption, and the like,” but also acknowledging the “abundant language in
the majority’s opinion that might be taken to cut against such a reading”); Danaya C.
Wright, The Logic and Experience of Law: Lawrence v. Texas and the Politics of Privacy, 15 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 408 (2004) (“[T]o the extent the Court’s ruling [in Lawrence] is
interpreted to protect only the privacy rights in the behavior that defines my identity, it has
the potential to force me back into the closet.”).
176. 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of
the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.” (emphasis added)).
177. See id. at 567 (“To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would de-
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duced gay sexual identity to one narrow definition.  Although Law-
rence forbade anti-sodomy laws, it still focused on the old trope that
acts—here, acts of sodomy—defined homosexuality,178 just as the
Texas statute struck down by the Court only forbade same-sex sodomy
acts.179  In this way, Lawrence promised much more than it delivered; it
became, as one author has noted, a legal text that was “easy to read,
but difficult to pin down.”180
For Texas, sodomy only mattered when performed, no matter
how privately, by two members of the same sex.181  For the Lawrence
Court, striking down Texas’s statute did not mean eradicating the
Court’s narrow interpretation of gay identity, for even in barring dis-
crimination against gays and overturning Hardwick, the Court could
not free itself from the same tired narrative of homosexual identity as
reduced to a single act, a multiplicity of voices shrunken down to the
consensual act of sodomy.182  Like its predecessors, Lawrence is a gay
rights case that “presents a problem of interpretation.”183
As others have argued in a slightly different context, “One cannot
interpret or apply Lawrence without situating it in history.”184  This
rings particularly true when the history applied is that of the hidden
narrative that structures most legal discussion of gay rights.
Examined carefully, Lawrence does its part to reinforce the slip-
page between act and identity, conduct and status, that has dominated
mean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse.”).
178. See id. at 575 (stating that the continued existence of Bowers and its approval of laws
prohibiting sodomy “demeans the lives of homosexual persons”).  As Eskridge notes, “male
homosexuality (and, quite irrationally, female homosexuality as well) is deeply associated
with anal sex.”  Eskridge, Body Politics, supra note 56, at 1023. R
179. The statute read in relevant part: “ ‘A person commits an offense if he engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.’” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
563 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003)).  Under the statute, “ ‘deviate sex-
ual intercourse’” refers to “‘(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person
and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the
anus of another person with an object.’” Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(1)).
180. Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2004).
181. See supra note 179. R
182. One example of the Court’s reliance on a heteronormative narrative is its discus-
sion of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992): “The
Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing, and education.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–74.
183. Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevi-
table Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312, 1312 (2004).
184. Eskridge, Body Politics, supra note 56, at 1012–13 (discussing Lawrence in the context R
of “traditionalist and religious responses to the lesbian and gay rights movement”).
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virtually every sexual-orientation case since Hardwick.185  In other
words, although the criminalizing statutes may have been struck
down, many Wildean narratives still complicate and pervade legal
thinking about gay rights.186  As Eskridge argues, “[T]he Court has by
no means rejected the general idea that the Constitution at least toler-
ates a body politics that trades on appeals to disgust and
contagion.”187
Lawrence was intentionally “written narrowly to avoid resolving the
whole range of issues regarding classifications based on . . . sexual
orientation,”188 and this narrow construction complicated matters fur-
ther.  The politics of avoidance and evasion can be traced directly to
the tactics used in Wilde’s trials.189  In other words, law alone cannot
fully interpret the path taken by the Court in Lawrence.190
In Lawrence, the Court signaled its intent to follow the traditional
understanding of homosexuality as sexual conduct early in the opin-
ion by invoking the Griswold v. Connecticut191 line of cases.192  To get to
this stage, the Lawrence Court re-interpreted Griswold, Eisenstadt v.
Baird,193 Carey v. Population Services International,194 and Roe v. Wade,195
assuming, without explaining, these cases concerned sexual conduct
rather than a more traditional understanding as cases concerning pro-
creation.196  This unarticulated shift in interpretation was necessary to
continue the artificial divide between same-sex acts and gay identity—
with unspoken narratives mediating the space in between.
185. As Danaya Wright has noted, historically, states have been allowed to criminalize a
particular act (homosexual intimacy) and then define people based on their desires to so
act.  Wright, supra note 175, at 404–05.  By doing this, she argues, “the state makes a per- R
son’s very identity a legitimate reason for discrimination.” Id.
186. Cf. Cahill, supra note 84, at 1192 (arguing that nominal separation between hetero- R
sexuality and homosexuality, such as allowing same-sex relationships to have the substance
of marriage without its name, “points back to homosexuality’s rhetorical past in a number
of ways”).
187. Eskridge, Body Politics, supra note 56, at 1014. R
188. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431,
446 (2005).
189. See supra Part II.
190. Hunter, supra note 180, at 1103–04. R
191. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
192. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003)  (“[T]he most pertinent beginning
point is our decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.” (citation omitted)).
193. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
194. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
195. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
196. As Hunter points out, “the Lawrence Court modified the meaning of those cases to
focus more on sexual conduct” and in doing so “readjusted [their] interpretation” to “de-
link[ ] . . . sex and marriage.”  Hunter, supra note 180, at 1110. R
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The Court noted that “[a]fter Griswold it was established that the
right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends be-
yond the marital relationship.”197  With this sentence, the Court im-
ported the nineteenth century narrative that reduces homosexual
identity to sexual conduct into its twenty-first century
jurisprudence.198
To give it credit, the Lawrence majority does at least try to expand
the narrative by which it interprets same-sex relationships.199  In criti-
cizing Hardwick’s reduction of all forms of gay identity to acts of sod-
omy, the Court pointed out the “far-reaching consequences” of
antisodomy statutes and noted that such statutes attempt “to control a
personal relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to
choose.”200  The very use of the word relationship to describe a same-
sex couple, as opposed to simple reliance on their sexual acts as the
defining characteristic, is certainly a step forward in the legal narrative
of gays and lesbians.  The expansion of the narrative is at its greatest
when Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, acknowledges the nar-
rowness of the act-as-identity trope, noting that “[w]hen sexuality
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring.”201
Even more promising, the Lawrence Court touches on one of the
lodestones of an expanded homosexual narrative by briefly discussing
the history of homosexual conduct in the United States.202  Specifi-
cally, the Court points out that the historical absence of legal prohibi-
tions focusing on homosexual conduct can be partially explained by
the fact that “the concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of
person did not emerge until the late 19th century.”203  By considering
the roots of the law’s limited interpretation of gay identity, the Court
finally seemed to understand that the multiplicity of gay identity longs
to burst out of the singularity of legal interpretation.204  Finally, the
197. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
198. See supra Part II.
199. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. R
200. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 567–70.
203. Id. at 568.  The Court continued, “Thus early American sodomy laws were not di-
rected at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity
more generally.” Id.
204. See, e.g., id. at 567 (advising “against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the
meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of
an institution the law protects”).
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Court seemed to hint at the possibility of separating sex from procrea-
tion and heterosexual marriage.205
Alas, it was not to be.  The Court’s brief dalliance with the possi-
bility of a multifaceted view of homosexuality soon dissipated in the
majority’s overruling of Hardwick, in which it allowed the lone act of
sodomy to be the primary, if not exclusive, signal for homosexuality as
a whole.206  If “the Court has only recognized and protected those
groups whose common conduct it considers worth protecting,”207
then its relatively new protection of gays and lesbians comes at the
cost of defining them solely by conduct.208  Indeed, the Court plainly
declared that certain forms of “conduct”—specifically, oral and anal
sex—essentially characterized the “homosexual lifestyle.”209  This
point was taken for granted despite the fact that scientific studies of
sexuality in the United States show that “twenty-five to fifty percent of
people having sex with members of the same gender concurrently
have sex with members of the opposite gender.”210  In other words,
the Court’s simplification therefore fails to clarify the rights of people
who have homosexual sex “but maintain a heterosexual identity.”211
The Court’s recognition and legitimization of gays and lesbians
in Lawrence thus continued to construct them as a singularity of iden-
tity, failing to recognize that not only are gays and lesbians defined by
more than one sexual act,212 but also that many others who may not
define themselves as gay or lesbian also participate in the same con-
205. See id. at 565 (“[T]he right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct
extends beyond the marital relationship.”).  For a more detailed discussion about the
Court’s history of linking sex and procreation, see James Allon Garland, Sex as a Form of
Gender and Expression After Lawrence v. Texas, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 297, 297, 300–03
(2006) (arguing that aside from the Court’s recognition of “a constitutionally protected
interest in same-sex intimacy,” Lawrence carries “even more signific[ance] as the first opin-
ion from the Court to speak positively about sex without reference to procreation”).
206. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The State cannot demean [the petitioners’] exis-
tence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.  Their right
to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their con-
duct without intervention of the government.”).
207. McGowan, supra note 183, at 1314. R
208. See Wright, supra note 175, at 407–08 (noting that “being gay is defined in our R
society as an identity based on acts that take place in private” and arguing that Lawrence
could only “redefine gay life in this country” if it “protects public as well as private rights”).
209. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573, 578 (describing the petitioners’ sexual practices,
namely anal sex, as “common to a homosexual lifestyle”).
210. Garland, supra note 205, at 312. R
211. Id. at 312–13 & n.97.
212. See, e.g., Richard D. Mohr, The Shag-a-delic Supreme Court: “Anal Sex,” “Mystery,”
“Destiny,” and the “Transcendent” in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 365, 375
(2004) (discussing a range of sexual activities available to homosexuals not prohibited by
the Texas statute in Lawrence).
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duct.213  In this way, the Lawrence Court reinforced the same box the
group has been attempting to expand since the days of Wilde.
After questioning the historical grounds relied upon in Hard-
wick,214 the Court paused to acknowledge that strong voices have long
condemned homosexual conduct as immoral215—“conduct” being
the key word in the Court’s acknowledgment.  In doing so, the Court
continued to conflate the act of same-sex sodomy with gay identity,216
relying on the limited narrative that continues to freeze the legal nar-
rative of gays and lesbians to their sexual acts:
[C]ondemnation [of homosexual conduct] has been shaped
by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable be-
havior, and respect for the traditional family.  For many per-
sons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to
which they aspire and which thus determine the course of
their lives.217
Although the Court did not overtly use these considerations to decide
the fate of the Texas anti-sodomy statute,218 they seep insidiously into
the rest of the majority opinion as the narrative underlying homosex-
ual conduct-as-status.  If prior cases relied upon the “gay stock charac-
ters” described above,219 Lawrence shed most of the old stock character
stories promoting discrimination against gays and lesbians but never
really condemned a particularly pernicious stock character, the “Mor-
ally Corrupt” practitioner of sodomy.220  By attempting to please, or at
least placate, all interest groups,221 the Lawrence Court, unwittingly or
not, permitted an ancient story about gays and lesbians—that their
213. See supra text accompanying notes 210–11. R
214. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. R
215. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003).
216. See Libby Adler, The Future of Sodomy, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197, 225 (2005) (observ-
ing that “[c]ritics who targeted the conflation of sodomy and gay identity are not cited by
the Lawrence Court” in its criticism of Hardwick).
217. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
218. Id.
219. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. R
220. See McGowan, supra note 183, at 1313 (“Lawrence has not ruled out moral distaste as R
a rational basis for state regulation.”). But see Adler, supra note 216, at 210 (discussing one R
post-Lawrence Eleventh Circuit case that may have been motivated by “the specter of the
homosexual pedophile [that] lingers between [the] lines of text” in Lawrence).
221. For example, the Court arguably limited Lawrence’s reach by noting that the case
did not involve minors or persons who might be coerced or might not easily refuse con-
sent, public conduct, prostitution, or government recognition of homosexual relation-
ships. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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behavior and thus their whole identity “is immoral and unaccept-
able”222—to remain embedded in the narrative text.
If Lawrence, like Romer and Hardwick, “is a multilayered story,”
then “[o]nly on its surface is it a story about removing the sanction of
criminal punishment from those who commit sodomy.”223  Ultimately,
Justice Kennedy’s sweeping statement rejecting the animus underlying
the Texas sodomy law still relied on sodomy-related acts to define gays
and lesbians: “When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law
of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the
private spheres.”224  Although Lawrence removed the word “outlawed”
from the standard “reductionist conflation of ostracized identity with
outlawed act,”225 the shrunken legal space in which to enact homosex-
ual identity has remained.
D. The Armed Forces: Fraternization and Contagion
Recent Supreme Court developments seem to have had little ef-
fect on the United States Armed Forces, where, until very recently, gay
men, bisexuals, and lesbians could be separated from military service
for engaging in any sort of “homosexual act.”226  Several cases over the
past twenty years have made this point crystal clear, illustrating the
extent to which Wildean narratives furthered in Hardwick retain mean-
ing and power.  For the Armed Forces and other quasi-military opera-
tions, simply engaging in same-sex sexual acts was enough to “stain”
your sexual identity as gay or lesbian.227  In contexts like these, the
Wildean narratives were only thinly hidden, like landmines that ex-
plode without warning.
For example, litigation in Padula v. Webster228 arose out of the
FBI’s refusal to hire people who engage in “homosexual conduct.”229
The FBI was purportedly concerned about the susceptibility of homo-
222. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
223. Tribe, supra note 87, at 1896. R
224. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
225. Tribe, supra note 87, at 1896. R
226. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.  On December 18, 2010, the Senate repealed its “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” ban on homosexuals openly serving in the military.  Carl Hulse, Senate Ends
Military Ban On Gays Serving Openly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at A1.
227. But see 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(A)–(E) (excepting from the law’s reach instances
where the homosexual “conduct is a departure from the member’s usual and customary
behavior” and “unlikely to recur,” and “the member does not have a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts”).
228. 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
229. Id. at 102.
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sexuals to “compromise or breach of trust.”230  Yet the FBI’s standard
of homosexual identification was a double one and inherently contra-
dictory: While gays were to be found out by their homosexuals acts, it
was their entire identity as homosexuals—and therefore as insecure,
neurotic, unstable, inverted creatures—that provided the justification
for the ban.231  This contradictory standard echoes the initial confu-
sion born out of the nineteenth century and the Wilde trials.
The slippery narratives concocted in the Wilde trials are recycled
in Padula, as the homosexual is portrayed as an untrustworthy “other”
who constantly performs a Dorian Gray-like betrayal upon everyone
with whom he or she interacts.  It is, in fact, precisely this ambiguity—
this slipperiness—of the homosexual that so galvanizes the FBI and
the court: The very indeterminacy that marks the contours of gay life
is the very thing about which the FBI feels most threatened.
To put it another way, the Wildean idea of the homosexual has
floated in a sea of obscurity and uncertainty since the time of its “crea-
tion.”  Much of the incessant harping on an acts-based definition of
homosexuality can be seen as a way to give the term some specificity,
some hard edges.  Combined with the historical tradition of not nam-
ing—non nominandum232—which until recently has scourged and ob-
scured the homosexual, the indeterminacy of homosexuality was a
swamp that those in power found easier to avoid entirely.233  Add this
to the fear and loathing traditionally inspired by homosexuals, and it
is no surprise that the FBI felt the simplest approach to homosexuality
would be to effectively apply a blanket refusal.
Thus, the FBI and the Padula court carried on the tradition of
litigating and ruling around homosexuality.  Further, this acts-based
divide only serves to illustrate the false division between heterosexual-
ity and homosexuality.234  While the nineteenth century did forge a
distinction between the two sexual identities, framing one as normal
230. Id. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. The FBI’s legal counsel recently declared that “administrative action is taken not
‘simply because of . . . sexual orientation’ but [that] homosexual conduct is a significant
factor.” Id. at 99 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added).  He further explained that
“in fairness . . . based upon experience, I can offer no specific encouragement that a ho-
mosexual applicant will be found who satisfies all of the requirements.” Id. (alteration in
original).  In explaining its decision, however, the court focused on the fact that homosex-
ual conduct is “criminalized in roughly one-half of the states,” as well as the “general public
opprobrium toward homosexuality.” Id. at 104.
232. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 215 & n.16
(19th ed. 1836) (translating “peccatum illud horribile, inter Christianos non nomi-
nandum” as “That horrible sin, not to be named among Christians”).
233. See supra Part III.
234. See supra text accompanying note 210. R
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and the other as abnormal,235 it is equally true that the one cannot
exist without the other.  Our current sociological understanding of
heterosexuality cannot survive without its opposite.  And just as heter-
osexual conduct cannot survive without its opposite, the trustworthy
(as defined negatively by the FBI236) cannot survive without the un-
trustworthy.  Like all such divisions, this too is constructed.  It is the
frailty of this barrier that the FBI and the Padula court tried so hard to
reinforce.
This fear of obscured, ambiguous narratives is omnipresent even
in opinions that are ostensibly supportive of gay rights.  In Watkins v.
United States Army,237 the plaintiff challenged an Army policy disquali-
fying homosexuals, but not heterosexuals, from service for engaging
in homosexual conduct.238  After being enjoined by a federal district
court from discharging the petitioner because of his affidavit that he
was a homosexual and had engaged in homosexual conduct, the Army
rejected his reenlistment application.239  Notably, the Army’s policy
did not bar service by heterosexuals who performed the very same
acts.240  Thus, the Army essentially upheld a code under which acts of
sodomy can only occur in the context of homosexual orientation.241
At the same time, however, the Army refused to define gays by any-
thing but sodomy.242
235. See supra Part II.
236. See supra text accompanying note 230. R
237. 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711
(9th Cir. 1989).
238. Id. at 1331, 1334.
239. Id. at 1333.
240. Id. at 1338–39.
241. See id. (noting that “[t]he regulations make any act or statement that might con-
ceivably indicate a homosexual orientation evidence of homosexuality,” while allowing
such evidence to be weighed against evidence of a heterosexual orientation).
242. This is so despite the fact that “the regulations ban homosexuals who have done
nothing more than acknowledge their homosexual orientation even in the absence of evi-
dence that the persons ever engaged in any form of sexual conduct.” Id. at 1337.  The
regulations define “‘homosexual’” as “‘a person, regardless of sex, who desires bodily con-
tact between persons of the same sex . . . with the intent to obtain or give sexual gratifica-
tion.’” Id.  For a decision by former-Judge Robert Bork upholding the discharge of a Navy
cryptographer for engaging in a consensual relationship with another Navy man, see
Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  Bork rejected Dronenberg’s
claimed right to engage in what Judge Bork deemed “homosexual conduct”; for Bork, such
conduct was enough to define his identity and legal status. See id. at 1397–98 (noting that
there is no constitutional right to engage in homosexual conduct and that the Navy’s pol-
icy of requiring discharge of those who do “is a rational means of achieving . . . legitimate
[state] interests,” such as by maintaining “‘mutual trust and confidence among service
members’” and “‘prevent[ing] breaches of security’” (second alteration in original)).
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The Army justified this circular standard by maintaining that sod-
omy only occurs in the context of homosexual orientation.  Desper-
ately trying to erase the slippage between homosexual and
heterosexual identities, and thus crystallizing their polarities, the
Army excused those heterosexual sodomites by blaming their behav-
ior on “immaturity, curiousity [sic], or intoxication.”243  This is a tactic
we saw in the Wilde trials and Hardwick: Not only is the heterosexual
history of sodomy obscured and designified, but the two identities are
frantically reified by an act that can only have significance in one
body.  While heterosexual men can be young, curious, or drunken
sodomites,244 homosexual men can only be wily or frightening to
others.  The Army’s heterosexual narrative can only be whitewashed
through the narrative of homosexual vilification.
More recent cases and policies follow the same paths.  The Clin-
ton-era “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (“the Act”)245 was merely a more mod-
ern version of non nominandum—what is not articulated need not be
acknowledged.  The Act requires the separation from the armed
forces of members of the military who engage, attempt to engage, in-
tend to engage, or have a propensity to engage in a homosexual
act.246  Although the Act was repealed by the Senate in December
2010,247 there was instant backlash from opponents arguing that al-
lowing gays and lesbians to serve openly would injure “unit
cohesion.”248
Simply put, the military is unerringly two-faced in a particularly
late nineteenth century way in its policy towards homosexuals.  On the
one hand, anyone who articulates even the most general of thoughts
about engaging in “homosexual acts” is to be removed from the
Armed Forces.249  On the other hand, as long as these thoughts, feel-
ings, propensities, and presumably acts remain out of sight—the pro-
243. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1336 (alteration in original) (quoting the Army’s reenlistment
regulation “that bars homosexuals from reenlisting”).
244. The court explained: “If a straight soldier and a gay soldier of the same sex engage
in homosexual acts because they are drunk, immature or curious, the straight soldier may
remain in the Army while the gay soldier is automatically terminated.” Id. at 1339.
245. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.  “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” has worked better in theory than in
practice.  As Judge Canby wryly noted in his partial dissent in Witt v. Department of the Air
Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008), the Act’s name was a misnomer in the case of the
plaintiff: “She did not tell, but the Air Force asked.” Id. at 822 n.1 (Canby, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
246. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b), (f).
247. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
248. Hulse, supra note 226. R
249. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) (listing the solicitation of a homosexual act as grounds
for separation).
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totypical hidden narrative—the member of the Armed Services may
continue to serve.250
The importance of the missing narrative’s role in current Armed
Forces policy was made clear in the discussion of the Act in Cook v.
Gates.251  In Cook, former members of the U.S. Armed Services alleged
that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” violated the Due Process, Equal Protec-
tion, and Free Speech Clauses of the Constitution.252  The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that despite the Su-
preme Court’s 2003 opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, the Act did not vio-
late any of the above-named clauses, and the First Circuit dismissed
the former military members’ claims.253
In dismissing the service members’ claims, however, the First Cir-
cuit discussed not only the terms of the Act but also its legislative his-
tory.254  The court cited in full the statement of then-Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, who explained the rationale for the
policy of removing homosexual military members from service:
It is very difficult in a military setting . . . to introduce a
group of individuals who . . . favor a homosexual lifestyle,
and put them in with heterosexuals who would prefer not to
have somebody of the same sex find them sexually attrac-
tive . . . .  [I]t would be prejudicial to good order and disci-
pline to try to integrate that in the current military
structure.255
The Act itself is similarly crafted, stating that “[t]he presence in the
armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the
high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohe-
sion that are the essence of military capability.”256  Even at the end of
the twentieth century, the unspoken narrative of the homosexual as a
deviant, uncontrollable sexual predator still held sway.
250. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160,
§ 571(d), 107 Stat. 1547, 1673 (1993) (“It is the sense of Congress that—(1) the suspen-
sion of questioning concerning homosexuality as part of the processing of individuals for
accession into the Armed Forces . . . should be continued, but the Secretary of Defense
may reinstate that questioning . . . if . . . it is necessary to do so in order to effectuate the
policy set forth in [10 U.S.C. § 654] . . . .”).
251. 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
252. Id. at 47.
253. Id. at 45, 65.
254. Id. at 45–47.
255. Id. at 45–46 (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-112, at 283 (1993)).
256. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2006), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
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Also paralleling the rise of the “invert” in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the Act defined homosexuality as purely act-based257 and focused
on homosexual acts, a member’s statement that he or she is gay or
bisexual, or that he or she is in a same-sex marriage258—three unmis-
takable outward signifiers, in other words, of the hidden deviancy
lurking inside.  This view is taken to such a degree that the Act even
permitted a service member to remain in the Armed Forces despite
his or her homosexuality if the member would show that he or she
does not plan to perform such acts in the future.259  Put another way,
the Act ensured that as long as a service member is able to camouflage
his or her nonheterosexual narrative—obfuscating that forbidden,
unarticulated persona—then the dominant narrative may proceed un-
trammeled.  Only by fostering namelessness can the belief in a simplis-
tic heterosexuality continue.
This work of unnaming was not the only Wildean leftover fos-
tered by the Act.  The Act’s rigidity in defining homosexuality—reduc-
ing it to “any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satis-
fying sexual desires” and “any bodily contact which a reasonable per-
son would understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to
engage in [homosexual acts]”260—tidily erased the multiplicity of to-
day’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or questioning (“LGBTQ”)
identities, shrinking it to a manageable, easily definable rubric.  In the
words of Judge Saris, who authored a separate opinion in Cook v.
Gates, “the line between ‘propensity’ and ‘orientation’ is razor-thin at
best.”261  For the Armed Services, an act of sodomy is the shrink-to-fit
tarnish that defines homosexuality.
Moreover, the Act not only allowed those who are LGBTQ to be
neatly lumped into one indistinguishable stew, but it also provided a
means to define and differentiate the dominant heterosexual narra-
tive.  This “taxonomic freeze-framing”262 of heterosexual versus
nonheterosexual is particularly valuable in addressing the startling
anxiety emanating from the Act, which reflects the Armed Services’s
257. Id. § 654(f)(1) (defining “homosexual” around an interest in engaging in “homo-
sexual acts”).
258. Id. § 654(b).
259. Id. § 654(b)(1).  This is merely one of a few requirements, all of which must be
shown. Id.
260. Id. § 654(f)(3).
261. 528 F.3d 42, 70 (1st Cir. 2008) (Saris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
262. CRAFT, supra note 11, at 5. R
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fear that barely contained transgression is lurking under the skin of
the average military member.263
Ironically enough, heterosexuality, in the eyes of the Armed Ser-
vices, is a terribly fragile state, something that can be easily breached
by even a mere propensity for homosexual activity.  This is evidenced by
the plaintiff’s case in Witt v. Department of the Air Force,264 where the Air
Force had such concern over Witt’s propensity for homosexual acts
that it discharged her for having a partner off base, even though she
followed the dictates of the Act while in service or on base.265  Such
fear of cross-contamination, of homosexual leakage, is itself the pri-
mary narrative hidden under the plain language of the Act.  Like the
sorry spectacle of the Wilde trials, these conflicting and fearful narra-
tives have inscribed their meaning on the law, projecting definitional
incoherence and confusion into the lives of gay and lesbian service
members.  For the military, the shadow of the Wilde trials always fol-
lows closely behind.
IV. AMBIGUOUS, FLICKERING TEXTS: DECODING THE NARRATIVE OF
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CASES
The strength of the Wilde narratives and the way they con-
structed a small box for the legal understanding of LGBTQ identity
has continued to endure.  These narratives “are universal and ater-
ritorial, occurring at diffuse, often media-based levels of scale” and
“involve the discursive spaces within which we produce and reproduce
tradition and identity.”266  Although some of the most damaging hid-
den stories no longer take prominence, and it is no longer a crime in
civilian life to engage in gay sex, the narrow legal space in which to
cast homosexual identity has remained.
This is true even in the most recent determination of sexual iden-
tity and mores: the same-sex marriage debate.  In opinions both sup-
portive and dismissive of gay rights—including Goodridge v. Department
of Public Health, Lewis v. Harris, In re Marriage Cases, and Varnum v.
Brien—state courts have created a definition for gay identity that is
263. Despite the recent repeal of the Act, there is still tremendous concern over having
openly gay and lesbian members of the military serve. See Kevin Baron, Marine Commandant
Concluded DADT Repeal May Risk Lives, STARS & STRIPES (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.stripes.
com/news/marine-commandant-concluded-dadt-repeal-may-risk-lives-1.128737 (quoting
Marine Corps Commandant General James Amos’s assertion that he opposed the repeal
because “‘[m]istakes and inattention or distractions cost Marines lives’”).
264. 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).
265. Id. at 809–10.
266. Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, Identity Processes, and the Kulturkampf: Why Feder-
alism Is Not the Main Event, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 391 (2008).
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ultimately just as narrow, if not toxic, as the more familiar act-equals-
identity.  In the fulcrum of the same-sex marriage debates, gay and
lesbian relationships have been retold as a simulacrum of heterosex-
ual relationships based on a narrow platform of procreation and
family.
A. Twenty-First Century Marriage Laws
The fight for same-sex marriage in state courts has not escaped
the strong polarizing power of old narratives.  Where courts have de-
cided the issue, they have fallen prey to the inexorable pull of tradi-
tional stories about sexuality, even when upholding the right to same-
sex marriage.  In these cases, homosexuality is inevitably recast as het-
erosexuality, with narrow parameters and a carefully constructed
wholesomeness that excludes many aspects of LGBTQ life.
1. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
In Goodridge,267 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rec-
ognized a right of gay marriage in the Commonwealth, but in doing
so, the court ended up relying on acts—this time, procreation and
child rearing—to define homosexuality.  Unlike Lawrence v. Texas,
which, as one scholar has noted, was “the first opinion from the Court
to speak positively about sex without reference to procreation,”268 the
Goodridge court relied extensively on the relative insignificance of pro-
creative sex in heterosexual marriages to underline its reasoning as to
why same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.269  In a similar way,
the court also rejected a fixed conception of “ ‘optimal’ child
rearing.”270
Although the decision in Goodridge was undeniably a good thing
for gay couples, its reliance on procreation and child rearing has its
dangers.  As Nancy Polikoff has contended, lesbian and gay parents’
embrace of a privileged position for marriage has in some ways under-
mined the larger movement for respect, diversity, and nondiscrimina-
267. The Goodridge court rejected three interests proffered by the state to justify denying
marriage to same-sex couples: (1) creating a favorable setting for procreation; (2) ensuring
that child rearing takes place in “optimal” settings; (3) saving state resources by limiting
the scope of public marital benefits.  798 N.E.2d 941, 961–64 (Mass. 2003).
268. Garland, supra note 205, at 297. R
269. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961–62 (“[I]t is the exclusive and permanent commit-
ment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of children, that is the
sine qua non of civil marriage.”).
270. Id. at 963.
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tion for nontraditional family units.271  In other words, it is possible
that the push for gay marriage has derailed the greater project of get-
ting society to accept all forms of LGBTQ relationships, including
those that do not fit into the comfortable dyad-marriage classification.
Similarly, Katherine Franke has argued that with the current tactics
used in the fight for same-sex marriage has come “a radical substitu-
tion or transformation of the nature of homosexual desire.”272  Thus
the legal tactic of casting same-sex couples as fundamentally similar to
opposite-sex couples, by means of heteronormative acts, has in some
ways diminished the multiplicity of personae that LGBTQ individuals
can don.  It diminishes their ability to explore a “lawless homosexual-
ity,”273 a homosexuality not regulated or defined by law.  At the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century, “the dangers inherent in this
particular paradigm shift”274 differ from those manifested in Wilde’s
trials, yet they still harken back to a similar theme: shrinking defini-
tions of gay identity in the law.275
The relentless process of normalizing gay actions, same-sex
couples, and LGBTQ lifestyle is evident in the text of the most recent
state same-sex marriage opinions.276  However beneficial to norms of
equality, the intellectual and legal process through which same-sex
couples are provided marriage rights also requires conformity to the
heterosexual regime.277  This required conformity ultimately results in
271. Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex
Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573, 585–86 (2005).
272. Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 236, 240 (2006).
273. Id. at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted).  As Franke ruminates,
What have been the costs of refusing the political and psychic uncertainty of re-
fusing to immediately articulate and legally nail down what it means to be gay?
What will happen to homo desire and homo sex when they run through the par-
ticular circuitry of fantasy sutured to marriage? . . .  [W]hat kind of sexual publics
and what forms of sociability might be made possible by a homosexuality that
strategically sidesteps robust legal recognition and regulation?
Id. at 244–45.
274. Id. at 238.
275. Franke goes on to argue that this legal reductionism carries an emotional reduc-
tionism as well: “As lesbigay people are herded into a particular form of sociability—a
narrow conception of family—we have lost an interest in, if not now disavow, other forms
of sociality that a generation ago we celebrated.” Id. at 246.
276. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003)
(characterizing plaintiffs as “families” and “parents”).
277. See, e.g., id. at 965 (“If anything, extending civil marriage to same-sex couples rein-
forces the importance of marriage to individuals and communities.  That same-sex couples
are willing to embrace marriage’s solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and
commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of marriage in our laws
and in the human spirit.”).
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a type of marriage “equality in which cultural differences are per-
ceived as threatening and the existence of dominant group superior-
ity and privilege is viewed as the norm.”278
Through the same-sex marriage opinions, the multivalence of gay
identity is forced into the conventional roles granted to heterosexual
couples wishing to marry and become parents.  Reframing gay couples
as “just like” heterosexual couples seems to be the only way that courts
can possibly imagine expanding the marriage franchise to nonheter-
osexuals.  Indeed, this erasure of difference and multiplicity has led
some commentators to urge caution when considering same-sex mar-
riage, preferring domestic partnership instead because only the latter
“will promote the cultural integrity, autonomy, and self-determination
of queer cultures and communities.”279
A careful look at the language in some recent same-sex marriage
cases illustrates the danger of reductionist defining.  In all these cases,
heterosexuality remains the “guiding paradigm”280 for marriage, and
same-sex couples must fit themselves into its norms to be granted its
accompanying rights.  The LGBTQ couple wishing to marry will have
to “shed[ ] any methodologies, practices, and values indigenous to the
minority group.”281  This is in part because same-sex marriage advo-
cates have carefully chosen their plaintiffs to “embrace the values of
the repro-normative domestic, preferring nice-looking couples with
children who, like ‘regular’ people, take their kids to little league and
school plays.”282  Embracing the heterosexual norm, however, has
made “the viability of counterpublics that lie beyond the social field of
marriage all the more difficult to imagine.”283
2. Lewis v. Harris
The importance of recreating same-sex couples in a conven-
tional, heterosexual role is also widely evident throughout Lewis v.
Harris, the New Jersey same-sex marriage case that granted same-sex
couples the same rights and benefits of marriage that heterosexuals
278. Charles R.P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and Inequality, 7
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 363, 364 (1998).
279. Id. at 365.
280. Id. at 369.
281. Id. at 370.  Pouncy elaborates the potential dangers of recognizing same-sex mar-
riage: “The extension of same-sex marriage will cloak gay and lesbian couples in the tradi-
tions of patriarchy and heterosexism.  Heterosexual norms will become the standards
applied to lesbian and gay relationships, and the development of queer cultural construc-
tions of intimate relationships will be stunted.” Id. (footnote omitted).
282. Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2704 (2008).
283. Id. at 2701.
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possess while denying them the actual nomenclature of the term
“marriage.”284  The Supreme Court of New Jersey began its opinion by
emphasizing the settled, long-term, and monogamous nature of the
seven plaintiff same-sex couples.285  Indeed, the court was remarkably
frank about its recasting of same-sex couples as heterosexual couples:
“In terms of the value they place on family, career, and community
service, plaintiffs lead lives that are remarkably similar to those of op-
posite-sex couples.”286  In case that statement did not do its transform-
ative work effectively enough, the New Jersey court spent considerable
ink explaining precisely how normal, committed, wholesome, civic,
family minded, and virtuously heterosexual each same-sex plaintiff
couple was.287
The Lewis court then upped the ante by discussing, at length, the
progeny of these same-sex couples and the similarity (and normalcy)
of same-sex families to opposite-sex families.288  Although the Su-
preme Court’s argument is unquestionably true—denying marriage
benefits to same-sex couples injures the children as much as the par-
ents289—the way the court went about establishing this fact further
shrinks a gay multiplicity of identity into bland, safe, heterosexual-like
exemplars.
As admirable as the Lewis court’s attempt to demystify and
destigmatize same-sex couples is, the court’s heavy hand leaves
LGBTQ individuals little choice but to follow precisely in the tradi-
tional marital mold if they wish to obtain any rights.  In fact, the Lewis
court not only seemed to require a couple or family structure almost
precisely like a standard heterosexual one in order to receive the
rights and benefits of marriage; the court also required the two mem-
bers of the same-sex couple to be committed—an additional require-
ment that is certainly not required for heterosexual couples wishing
state-sanctioned marriage rights in New Jersey.290
284. See 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006) (holding that the legislature might either “amend
the marriage statutes to include same-sex couples or create a parallel statutory structure”
that provides the same rights though it “uses a title other than marriage”).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 201.
287. Id. at 201–02.
288. Id. at 218.
289. As the Lewis court noted, “There is something distinctly unfair about the State rec-
ognizing the right of same-sex couples to raise natural and adopted children and placing
foster children with those couples, and yet denying those children the financial and social
benefits and privileges available to children in heterosexual households.” Id.
290. The Lewis court spelled it plainly: “We conclude that denying to committed same-sex
couples the financial and social benefits and privileges given to their married heterosexual
counterparts bears no substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Id.
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Granted, the New Jersey legislature and many of its courts have
been “at the forefront of combating sexual orientation discrimination
and advancing equality of treatment toward gays and lesbians.”291  But
this does not change the transformative work these bodies do, how-
ever unconsciously, to recast same-sex couples, in all their edgy multi-
plicity, into minimally threatening heterosexual simulacrums.
3. Varnum v. Brien
In holding that the Iowa statute limiting civil marriage to unions
between men and women is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of
Iowa followed much the same path as the Lewis court.  In Varnum v.
Brien, the Iowa court almost immediately reframed the same-sex plain-
tiff couples into safe, familiar normalcy, characterizing them as “re-
sponsible, caring, and productive individuals” who “maintain
important jobs, or are retired, and are contributing, benevolent mem-
bers of their communities.”292  In a vein parallel to Lewis, the Varnum
court pointed out that all six plaintiff couples were in “committed re-
lationships”293—presumably in order to establish their worthiness and
similarity to heterosexual couples.  In fact, the Varnum court took care
to establish the “committed and loving” relationships of the plaintiff
couples and their raising of families, “just like heterosexual
couples.”294  In this way, the court (re)categorized Iowa’s same-sex
couples as simulacrums of the most traditional of heterosexual mar-
ried couples, wiping out their differences with a broad brush.
Moreover, the Iowa Supreme Court fell back on the old idea that
sexual acts define identity, although presumably with the best of in-
tentions.  In declaring that Iowa’s marriage statute targeted gays and
lesbians, the Varnum court cited Romer, noting Romer’s implication that
“sexual orientation is a trait that defines an individual.”295  Interpret-
ing Romer in this way, well-meaning as it may be, reinforces the troub-
ling belief that the performance of or desire to perform
nontraditional sexual acts is the preeminent defining characteristic of
LGBTQ individuals, instead of just an aspect of their personae—as is
assumed for heterosexual individuals.  This version of “sexual act as
identity” harkens back to Krafft-Ebing and the early defining of the
at 220 (emphasis added).  The Lewis court did not, however, explain the test for a commit-
ted same-sex relationship.
291. Id. at 213–14 (discussing judicial and legislative actions benefitting homosexuals).
292. 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 883.
295. Id. at 885 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
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“invert”296 and, as discussed in Part II, is both reductionist and
discriminatory.
4. In re Marriage Cases
Similarly, the Supreme Court of California, in In re Marriage Cases,
framed its decision to extend to same-sex couples the constitutional
right to marry as a matter of their equal capacity to establish “loving
and long-term committed relationship[s] with another person and
responsibly to care for and raise children.”297  Thus, within the first
few pages of the opinion, the court cast the family relationships as
traditional heterosexual ones.298
Although the California court laudably noted how same-sex
couples and families deserve the same dignity and respect as opposite
sex ones,299 its argument explaining why excluding same-sex couples
from the designation of marriage is unconstitutional relied heavily on
the similarity of same-sex and opposite-sex couples—making the subtle
point that only families approximating the heterosexual ideal would
truly be acceptable candidates for marriage.  For example, in fleshing
out the constitutional right to marriage, the court relied on prior Cali-
fornia decisions recognizing “the linkage between marriage, establish-
ing a home, and raising children in identifying civil marriage as the
means available to an individual to establish, with a loved one of his or
her choice, an officially recognized family relationship.”300  This kind
of statement might exclude from the possibility of civil marriage those
who do not follow the traditional paths of relationships by creating a
“home”—itself a term freighted with images of Kirche, Kueche,
Kinder301—and raising children.  Put another way, the California
court so tightly linked a same-sex couple’s ability to marry with the
creation of a very conventional family structure that it placed a deli-
cate, but nonetheless real, question mark on whether a nonconform-
296. See supra notes 40–50 and accompanying text. R
297. 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008).
298. See id. at 399 (recognizing the “substantive right of two adults who share a loving
relationship to join together to establish an officially recognized family of their own—and,
if the couple chooses, to raise children within that family”).  For a different, but related,
discussion about child custody and visitation disputes, see Rachel Simmonsen, Legislating
After Janice M.: The Constitutionality of Recognizing De Facto Parenthood in Maryland, 70 MD. L.
REV. 525 (2011).
299. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 400.
300. Id. at 422.
301. Kirche, Kueche, Kinder is a German saying translated as “Church, Kitchen, Chil-
dren” that denotes the role of women in society. See Thomas J. Scheff, The Emotional Rela-
tional World: Shame and the Social Bond, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 255, 261
(Jonathan H. Turner ed., 2001).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-4\MLR403.txt unknown Seq: 50  5-JUL-11 14:49
1034 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:985
ing same-sex couple would be able to retain the marriage franchise in
the future.
Likewise, the court’s emphasis that “the right to marry represents
the right of an individual to establish a legally recognized family with
the person of one’s choice”302 was undoubtedly meant to be inclusive,
but it mapped same-sex marriage onto children and procreation.
This was made clear when the court supported its statement with a
variety of U.S. Supreme Court opinions, all of which tightly linked the
significance of the right to marry to the creation of a family and, spe-
cifically, to the production of children.303  By relying on these cases,
the most recent of which is over thirty-years-old (the oldest is over 120-
years-old), the court unwittingly shackled same-sex couples’ ability to
attain legal marriage to a heteronormative version of relationships
and marriage.
Certainly there are (and continue to be) many same-sex couples
who wish to marry in part to give legitimacy and normalcy to their
children and families.304  But to frame the legal ability to marry on a
base of nuclear families, child rearing, and wholesome community
lives—as the Supreme Court of California does—is to create a right of
marriage potentially exclusionary to the same-sex community.305  In
this way, the Supreme Court of California, like so many well-meaning
courts before it, provided a much narrower space for LGBTQ families
than might have been created without the pressure of the unarticu-
lated narratives hiding beneath the surface of the opinion.
Like Varnum, the California court also fell back onto the old
trope of act-is-identity, defining and categorizing LGBTQ individuals
by their sexual acts.  Immediately prior to its discussion of whether
sexual orientation should be considered a suspect classification, the
302. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 423 (emphasis added).
303. In a footnote, the Court quoted from, for example, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
386 (1978) (“‘It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same
level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and fam-
ily relationships.’”), and Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (“‘[Marriage] is the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization
nor progress.’”).  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 423 n.35. (alteration in original).
304. Cf. Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and the Mar-
riage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3, 56 (2008) (discussing same-
sex couples seeking to celebrate “their civil union ceremony in a traditional place for wed-
dings [in order to] bolster the legitimacy and normalcy of the identity claim being per-
formed and secured through the ceremony”).
305. Ironically, the California court devoted part of its opinion to why the right to marry
should not be limited to couples who can procreate naturally. See In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d at 430–34 (denying that the constitutional right to marry necessarily is delimited by
procreation).
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court first classified “gay individuals” as those people who are “sexually
attracted to persons of the same sex and thus, if inclined to enter into
a marriage relationship, would choose to marry a person of their own
sex or gender.”306  Then, in the accompanying footnote, the court
quoted the amicus curiae brief filed by various mental health organi-
zations, which defined homosexuality in very narrow terms: “Sexual
acts and romantic attractions are categorized as homosexual or heter-
osexual according to the biological sex of the individuals involved in
them, relative to each other.  Indeed, it is by acting—or desiring to
act—with another person that individuals express their heterosexual-
ity, homosexuality, or bisexuality.”307  By relying on this type of defini-
tion, one delineated by sexual feelings and acts, the California court
once again delimited a small space for the gay or lesbian identity.
This shrunken space for the nonheterosexual persona has a direct
link to the early definition of the homosexual male as an “invert”—
both times, the work of the psychiatric community and their reduc-
tionist views contributed to such a definition.308
5. Chambers v. Ormiston
Despite the increasing number of states that grant recognition to
same-sex marriage,309 there are still many more that deny recognition
not only to same-sex marriage but also to its closely related cousin,
same-sex divorce.  In Chambers v. Ormiston, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island refused to recognize the divorce of a same-sex couple
306. Id. at 441.
307. Id. at 441 n.59 (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of the American Psychological Ass’n et
al. at 33, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (No. 4365) [Hereinafter In re Marriage Cases
Amicus Brief]) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Granted, the brief goes on to explain
that sexual orientation includes not just sexual behavior but also “‘bonds’” that “‘encom-
pass nonsexual physical affection between partners, shared goals and values, mutual sup-
port, and ongoing commitment.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage Cases Amicus Brief, supra, at
33–34).  But these additional definitional criteria are, notably, additional; they do not offer
an alternative understanding but an expanded one. See id. (quoting In re Marriage Cases
Amicus Brief, supra, at 33–34) (describing nonsexual bonds as “‘[i]n addition to sexual
behavior’”).
308. This is not terribly surprising, of course, as the American Psychiatric Association is
the same organization that originally classified homosexuality as a mental disorder in the
first version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOS-
TIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL DISORDERS 38–39 (1952), available at http://www.
psychiatryonline.com/DSMPDF/dsm-i.pdf (including “homosexuality” in the category of
mental disorders titled “Sexual deviation”).
309. See Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/HumanServices/SameSexMarriage/
tabid/16430/Default.aspx (last updated Feb. 2011) (“Since 1996, many states have enacted
legislation prohibiting same-sex marriages or the recognition of same-sex marriages
formed in another jurisdiction.”).
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married elsewhere,310 leaving the couple in legal purgatory.  The
Court reached this result by holding that it was without subject-matter
jurisdiction to entertain the petition.311  One of the reasons for the
court’s ruling was the absence of statutory language encompassing
same-sex divorce.312  This legal inability to articulate same-sex divorce
led to a curtailment of legal rights in a way reminiscent of the inability
to articulate, legally or otherwise, Oscar Wilde’s alleged acts in the late
nineteenth century.313
6. Breaking the Same-Sex Marriage Mold
In part, same-sex marriage “cases articulate a yearning to be gov-
erned by and within the surveillance of the state.”314  But as Katherine
Franke has argued, what would happen if the LGBTQ couple took its
position outside the web of legal regulation as a positive, not a nega-
tive?315  In other words, since the identities of the individuals in same-
sex relationships are currently neither criminal nor recognized under
the law, could this be seen as an open space allowing for growth in-
stead of a lacuna that must be filled with regulation?  Recall that as
Anglo-American law has formally recognized relations that are not
strictly heterosexual, it has imposed more and more rigid definitions
on those it chooses to define.316  It is all too possible that the narra-
tives constructed by formal recognition of same-sex marriage might be
as restrictive and shrunken as those conflating act and identity over
one hundred years prior.  Queer narratives may be best served by at-
tempts to stay out of the law’s shadow.317
Ultimately, although the ability to marry should be extended to
everyone, gay or straight, queer or transgendered, the way state courts
are permitting same-sex couples to access this right is dependent on
heterosexual mores that are heavily reliant on limited, carefully con-
310. 935 A.2d 956, 967 (R.I. 2007).
311. Id.
312. See id. at 963 (“As we understand the language of the existing divorce statute, it
does not constitute ‘express language conferring subject-matter jurisdiction upon the Fam-
ily Court’ whereby it could entertain a divorce petition involving two persons of the same
sex.”).
313. As Megan Cahill notes, “The [Rhode Island] Court also continued a deeply-rooted
legal and cultural tradition of talking about same-sex intimacy by, well, not talking about
it.”  Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage: The Relationship That Dare Not Speak Its Name?, R.I. B.J.,
May–June 2008, at 35, 35.
314. Franke, supra note 272, at 246. R
315. Franke, supra note 282, at 2687–88. R
316. See, for example, the cases cited in Part IV.A.1–5.
317. This is partially because “law’s shadow threatens to regulate as much of social life as
it can plausibly extend its reach.”  Franke, supra note 282, at 2699. R
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scribed narratives and potentially marginalizing and harmful to queer
culture.  The true challenge, as Franke notes, is how to “craft[ ] argu-
ments that support the extension of marriage rights to same-sex
couples who want them, while not doing so at the price of denigrating
or shrinking an affective sexual liberty outside of marriage.”318  Put
another way, how do we free LGBTQ narratives from their gendered
prisons and allow a more nuanced, pluralistic understanding of sexu-
ality and legal relationships?
The recent same-sex marriage cases also reflect the late nine-
teenth century Wildean difficulty with and hesitancy over naming.  Al-
though gays and lesbians now have proper names and enter into
common discourse, the squeamishness over clearly and cleanly declar-
ing gayness continues.  The convention of namelessness, of refusing to
officially name and delineate homosexuality, still holds in the twenty-
first century.
The continuation of this convention is nicely illustrated in Lewis,
in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey could not quite bring itself
to allow same-sex couples to use the term “marriage” to describe their
partnerships.319  Despite the Lewis court’s emphasis that the New
Jersey Constitution grants to disadvantaged groups “a fair opportunity
‘of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness,’”320 the court de-
clined to grant same-sex couples use of the term “marriage” for their
long-term commitment.321  The Lewis court rejected the plaintiff’s ar-
gument that a parallel legal structure, called by a name other than
marriage, consigns them to second-class citizenship,322 responding
that as long as same-sex couples received the same rights as heterosex-
ual marital couples, the use of the word “marriage” is unimportant.323
But despite the court’s breezy dismissal of the plaintiff’s argu-
ment, the refusal to allow same-sex couples the sobriquet of marriage
is a distinction with a difference.  Given the long and infamous history
of the law’s—and society’s—skittishness about naming those who
318. Id. at 2688.  As Franke argues,
The reach and insistence of marriage’s shadow teach us how difficult it will
be to pull off the twin tasks of securing marriage rights for same-sex couples while
seeking to shrink or hem in the shadow that marriage casts more structurally over
those people who desire to have their sexual and affective lives and attachments
take place in a social terrain that they intend to occupy ground outside of govern-
ance of marriage.
Id. at 2699.
319. See supra text accompanying note 284. R
320. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220 (N.J. 2006) (quoting N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 1).
321. Id. at 222–23.
322. Id. at 221.
323. Id. at 221–22.
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identify themselves as LGBTQ, the resurgence of non nominandum—
the disinclination to define and delineate the variety of homosexual
identities and activities, to reserve naming only for normalcy—is a re-
surgence of the same insidiousness that led the London Times to refer
to the charges against Oscar Wilde in his second and third trials as
simply “gross indecency.”324  The Lewis court’s conclusion—“a differ-
ence in name”325—is of great magnitude, perhaps more than the
court realized.
In its judicial punt of the issue, the Lewis court failed to realize
that official, legal nomenclature matters.  It is not enough to say, as the
majority did, that “same-sex couples will be free to call their relation-
ships by the name they choose and to sanctify their relationships in
religious ceremonies in houses of worship.”326  If same-sex couples
whose relationships are mirror images of heterosexual marriage are
deserving enough to be granted the same rights and responsibilities as
marital couples, then they should also be included in the terminol-
ogy.327  Otherwise, we continue to follow the same tarnished path set
at the end of the nineteenth century.
B. California’s Proposition 8: New Wine, Old Bottles
The political backlash sparked by decisions like Lawrence, Good-
ridge, Lewis, Varnum, and In re Marriage Cases has had some very real
consequences.  Thirteen states added language to their constitutions
defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman.328  In-
deed, an important (though unfortunate) short-term consequence of
Goodridge and other same-sex marriage opinions may be the counterat-
tack they have inspired.329
This battle has been most recently fought in California, where
Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment banning same-sex mar-
riage, recently passed as a public initiative with over fifty percent of
the vote.330  In response, a consortium of same-sex couples and other
324. See supra text accompanying notes 61–64. R
325. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 222.
326. Id. at 223.
327. This point is hammered home by the partial dissent of Chief Judge Poritz, who, in
declaring that the nomenclature of marriage should also be extended to same-sex couples,
argued that “[w]e must not underestimate the power of language.” Id. at 226 (Poritz, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
328. Klarman, supra note 188, at 466.  Before 2004, only four state constitutions had R
such provisions. Id.
329. See id. at 482 (“[T]he most significant short-term consequence of Goodridge . . . may
have been the political backlash that it inspired.”).
330. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2008, at A1.
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gay marriage supporters filed suit in the Supreme Court of California,
asking that Proposition 8 be overturned as an illegal revision of the
California Constitution.331  The Supreme Court of California, in
Strauss v. Horton,332 declined to overturn the initiative, declaring it
narrow enough to pass constitutional muster.333
In a move that many found confusing,334 however, the Supreme
Court of California also held that Proposition 8 applied only prospec-
tively, leaving intact the roughly 18,000 same-sex marriages that oc-
curred before November 5, 2008, when the proposition was
enacted.335  Moreover, the California court held that Proposition 8
did not entirely abrogate the constitutional right of same-sex couples
to “‘establish . . . an officially recognized and protected family possessing
mutual rights and responsibilities and entitled to the same respect
and dignity accorded a union traditionally designated as mar-
riage.’”336  Finally, like the New Jersey court in Lewis, the California
court reluctantly—and in apparent opposition to its previous opin-
ion337—attempted a sleight of hand with the use of the word “mar-
riage,” contending that although Proposition 8 reserved the
designation of “marriage” for heterosexual couples, same-sex couples
had virtually equal protection under California law and could obtain
marriage-like benefits.338
The California court’s majority opinion travels down many of the
familiar paths blazed by the late nineteenth century Wilde trials and
the legal definition and identity shrinkage that followed.  What the
Strauss court tried to minimize and dismiss as negligible—the designa-
tion of “marriage”—goes to the very heart of the legal definition/
331. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59, 68–69 (Cal. 2009).  For more on the Califor-
nia Supreme Court’s holding in Strauss, see Adam Farra, Comment, Theories of Discrimina-
tion and Gay Marriage, 69 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 1, 14–16 (2010).
332. 207 P.3d 48.
333. See id. at 116, 122 (interpreting Proposition 8 “as simply carving out a limited ex-
ception to the reach of the constitutional rights of privacy and due process as explicated in
the majority opinion in the Marriage Cases”).
334. See, e.g., Legal Analysis of Strauss v. Horton: California’s Proposition 8 Challenge, FAMILY
FAIRNESS (May 27, 2009), http://familyfairness.org/blog/marriage/legal-analysis-strauss-v-
horton-california-proposition-8/ (finding the court’s reasoning behind not applying Pro-
position 8 retroactively to be troubling, and arguing that it reflects a misinterpretation of
the pertinent statutory language and raises a “host of unanswered questions”).
335. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 119–22.
336. Id. at 77 (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399 (2008)).
337. In In re Marriage Cases, the court described with much detail the importance of
marriage to the individual, but it made no distinction between the substantive relationship
and its name.  See 183 P.3d at 424–28.
338. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 61–62.
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identity problem.  As I have discussed extensively above,339 the ques-
tions of naming and of granting proper rights of recognition, are cru-
cial to up-ending the punishing, limiting narratives that plague the
legal rights of LGBTQ individuals.340
The California same-sex marriage debate possesses other similari-
ties to the Wilde trials, as well.  Like Wilde’s legal travails, the fate of
same-sex marriage in California has also garnered national attention
with a trial of its own, this time a federal trial initiated by a same-sex
couple challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8 under the
Federal Constitution, known as Perry v. Schwarzenegger.341  With promi-
nent counsel,342 extensive witness testimony from same-sex plain-
tiffs,343 a location in San Francisco (the home base of the Ninth
Circuit), and heavy press coverage,344 it is possible that the Perry trial
has garnered as much, if not more, attention as the original scandal of
the Wilde trials.
Intriguingly, opposition to the filing of Perry did not come solely
from supporters of Proposition 8.  Soon after the case was filed, a vari-
ety of civil-rights groups issued statements condemning the trial.
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, the American Civil Lib-
erties Union, and the National Center for Lesbian Rights all opposed
the filing of the federal suit, noting that a federal challenge could
potentially do more harm than good at the present time.345  Later,
339. See supra Parts II–III.
340. The Strauss court seems to have a vague realization of the stakes involved with the
“naming” question, as it does note that “we by no means diminish or minimize the signifi-
cance that the official designation of ‘marriage’ holds for both the proponents and oppo-
nents of Proposition 8.” Strauss, 207 P.3d at 61.  But this realization is contradicted by the
court’s many later references to the relatively minimal import on same-sex couples of los-
ing the marriage designation. See, e.g., id. at 116 (“Same-sex couples retain all of the funda-
mental substantive components encompassed within the constitutional rights of privacy
and due process, with the sole (albeit significant) exception of the right to equal access to
the designation ‘marriage’ . . . .  Although Proposition 8 does diminish the rights of same-
sex couples . . . in this one respect, it does not have the sweeping constitutional effect
suggested by [an argument opposing the amendment].”).
341. See 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding Proposition 8
unconstitutional).
342. Theodore Olson and David Boies represented the plaintiffs.  Jesse McKinley, Bush
v. Gore Foes Join to Fight California Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A1.
343. See Lisa Leff & Paul Elias, Calif. Couples Tell of Gay Marriage Ban Toll, CHARLESTOWN
GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Jan. 12, 2010, at 11A (describing testimony given at trial).
344. See, e.g., id. (reporting on the Perry trial); McKinley, supra note 342; Jesse McKinley, R
Personal Focus as Same-Sex-Marriage Trial Opens in California, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, at A12.
345. See Mike McKee, Infighting Roils Prop 8 Challenge, RECORDER (S.F.), July 21, 2009, at 1
(noting that the three civil rights groups had initially “bad-mouth[ed] the suit as too
risky”).  One concern was that “a loss before the Supreme Court could spoil the chances of
future lawsuits on behalf of same-sex marriage.”  McKinley, supra note 342. R
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however, the groups applied as plaintiff-intervenors in the federal
case346 after filing an amicus curiae brief that sought to narrow the
issue explored in Perry.347  The three groups believed in a very differ-
ent strategy for gaining acceptance for same-sex marriage than did the
plaintiffs’ counsel, who supported a more cautious approach based on
the specific circumstances of California’s same-sex marriage debate.348
In contrast, the plaintiffs’ counsel wished to litigate a broader case
predicated on the Federal Constitution.349  And what was this struggle
but a struggle over control of the LGBTQ narrative, in law and in life?
In this age of Internet and video streaming, the public performa-
tive aspects of the Perry trial contain tremendous potential.  First, the
trial court planned to broadcast videos of the trial on YouTube to
open the proceedings to a larger audience.350  Former-Chief United
States District Judge for the Northern District of California Vaughn
Walker approved the plan, in large part due to his belief that the issue
of same-sex marriage “was appropriate for wide dissemination because
it dealt with an issue of wide interest and importance.”351  The Ninth
Circuit agreed to live-stream the video of the trial to federal court-
houses in California, Oregon, Washington, and New York City.352
The Perry defendants, however, were concerned that they would
be “harassed or intimidated” if the trial was taped and disseminated
over the video-sharing site.353  Accordingly, the defendants filed a mo-
tion requesting a stay of the district court’s order with the Supreme
Court.354  Two hours before the trial was to start, the Court tempora-
rily blocked any videos of the trial from being posted, explaining that
the Justices needed more time to review the issue.355  The Justices also
346. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene as Party Plaintiffs; Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No.
09-CV-2292).
347. McKee, supra note 345. R
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Bob Egelko, Prop. 8 Courtroom Videos Get Support, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 16, 2011, at C1.
351. Leff & Elias, supra note 343. R
352. News Release, Pub. Info. Office: U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Federal Court-
houses to Offer Remote Viewing of Proposition 8 Trial (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.ca9.us
courts.gov/datastore/general/2010/01/08/Prop8_Remote_Viewing_Locations.pdf.
353. Carol J. Williams, Supreme Court Bars Video of Prop. 8 Trial, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010,
at 9.
354. Application for the Immediate Stay of the District Court’s Order Permitting Public
Broadcast of Trial Proceedings, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 1132 92010) (mem.)
(No. 09A648).
355. Hollingsworth, 130 S. Ct. 1132 (staying video streaming of the trial until Wednesday,
January 13, 2010, at 4:00 PM eastern time); see also Leff & Elias, supra note 343.  Two days R
later, the Supreme Court granted the application for a stay of the District Court’s order
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said they would not permit live-time streaming of the trial at other
Ninth Circuit courthouses.356  Thus, even the concern and fear over
who would control the national narratives about same-sex marriage
was played out on the national stage.
Even without an expansive national audience, however, the plain-
tiff same-sex couples’ extensive testimony has already proved persua-
sive in reframing a narrative rife with troubles.  After testimony ended,
one of the lawyers for the plaintiffs claimed that proceedings showed
how “the marriage ban was irrational and that the November 2008
vote was tainted by prejudice and ‘hateful and erroneous
messages.’”357  And indeed, after vigorous cross-examination, defense
witnesses conceded that studies show that “children reared from birth
by same-sex couples fare as well as those raised by opposite-sex par-
ents, and marriage would benefit same-sex families.”358
As in Oscar Wilde’s 1895 trials, the federal Proposition 8 trial also
provided a remarkable intersection of law, narrative, and sexual orien-
tation.  First, the trial was a headline-grabbing event from the moment
the case was first filed: from the high-profile counsel, to the opposi-
tion from pro-gay rights groups, to the outcry over video streaming.
Like the Wilde trials, the participants in Perry—both lawyers and plain-
tiffs—are out to make news and invite all sorts of media coverage.359
When Judge Walker ruled that Proposition 8 violated the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process in August
2010,360 both sides immediately went to the media to air their conclu-
sions and emotions.361
Additionally, the personal lives of all the participants in the Perry
trial—not just the plaintiff couples—have attracted significant scru-
permitting the broadcast of the trial.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 714–15 (2010)
(per curiam).
356. Hollingsworth, 130 S. Ct. at 1132.
357. Maura Dolan, Testimony Ends in Same-Sex Marriage Trial, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010.
358. Id.
359. Courting Attention: Covering California’s Marriage Trial (NPR Radio Broadcast Jan. 20,
2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122763122
(noting that attorney Ted Olson asked David Boies to be his partner in part to “make a
more powerful case, a case that would get certainly more coverage”).
360. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 995, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
361. This process continues.  Since the Perry court overturned Proposition 8, every step
of the case has been in the news, including the appeal to the Ninth Circuit and its subse-
quent certification of the standing question to the California Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Jesse McKinley, California: Judges Ask for Clarity on Same-Sex Marriage Measure, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2011, at A13 (noting the Ninth Circuit’s certification of a question of state law to the
Supreme Court of California).
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tiny.362  Just as in the Wilde trials, scrutiny has fallen upon the per-
sonal lives of the supporting actors, including the judge.  The media
has seized on the open secret that Chief Judge Walker is gay,363 even
though litigants on both sides claim Judge Walker’s sexuality makes
no difference.364
And yet the fact that this non-news merited such attention illus-
trates that when dealing with the legacy of the Wilde narratives, the
boundaries are fluid and difficult to enforce.  As in the Wilde trials,
where Wilde’s personal life and actual written narratives not only
seeped into the first libel trial but became the basis for his two gross
indecency trials, sexual identity remains hard to box in, limit, or de-
fine, particularly in the legal context.  Contain it as you might, narra-
tive always breaks through.
V. CONCLUSION
In reviewing how the law has structured sexual identity, from the
Wilde trials to the federal Proposition 8 trial, we cannot help but rec-
ognize that narrative has always undergirded that frame.  From the
beginning, laws aimed at acts were in fact aimed at actors—acts
quickly became a proxy for identity, and identities have too often
been reduced to acts—and the limited range of tropes has been re-
peatedly invoked to reach legal outcomes. Even today, the license we
grant LGBTQ couples is limited by our heteronormative constraints.
We have taken small but important steps towards opening up the still-
bounded story of gay and lesbian identity into a wider, richer narra-
tive, a narrative that views same-sex relationships as more than con-
duct, the LGBTQ community as more than sexual actors, and LGBTQ
relationships as broader than just same-sex marriage.  How we con-
tinue down this path, however, is a story yet untold.
362. See, e.g., Courting Attention, supra note 359 (discussing two couples’ witness R
testimony).
363. See, e.g., Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Judge Being Gay a Nonissue During Prop. 8
Trial, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 7, 2010, at C1.
364. Id. (noting comments by opponents of Proposition 8 to the effect that Judge
Walker’s background is a “nonissue” and comments by proponents of Proposition 8 that
they will “ ‘not . . . say anything about that’” should they appeal an adverse decision).
